

The Role of the Individual in Ephoros' *Histories*

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Introduction

Students of Greek historiography are intimately familiar with Thucydides' opinion on the cause of the Peloponnesian War. It is remarkable for its lack of emphasis on individual actors, despite the clear existence of Athenian and Spartan leaders who shaped the policy of their respective states. In his description of the conflicts and debates that preceded the war (1.24-88), he never mentions Pericles, while he presents Sparta's King Archidamus as advocating unsuccessfully against the war. Neither of them are given agency in his description of the outbreak of the war. Moreover, Thucydides tells us that the complaints advanced by the relevant parties before the declaration of war only distract from the real cause of the war, which he sees as fear of power:

To the question why they broke the treaty, I answer by placing first an account of their grounds of complaint and points of difference, that no one may ever have to ask the immediate cause which plunged the Hellenes into a war of such magnitude. The real cause I consider to be the one which was formally most kept out of sight. The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable (1.23, trans. J. M. Dent).

For Thucydides, Athenian power contained within itself the seeds of war, and war was the natural result of its growth. Pericles and Archidamus are irrelevant at this point in the work because, however capable they may have been as leaders, they could not prevent the fear of domination inherent in human nature from emerging in response to the threat presented by Athenian power.

Ephoros, in contrast, places the blame for the outbreak of the war upon the actions of Pericles.¹ Ephoros wrote extensively about the Peloponnesian War in his account of events in the Greek world from 1069 to 341, which bore the title the *Histories*. Ephoros' account of events

¹ I have attempted to transliterate Greek words in fashion that is both faithful to the original and respects established modern usages. For Ephoros, his name is reproduced as Ephorus only in direct quotes from authors who chose to Latinize his name.

leading up to the war (*FrGH* 70 F196) is preserved in Diodorus Siculus' *Bibliothēke Historike* at 12.38.1-41.1.² He writes that Pericles, needing to account for money he had stolen from the treasury of the Delian League, sought to involve Athens in a large conflict that would require his leadership and thus distract the citizens from any charges of impropriety leveled against him. Moreover, in Ephoros' account it was Alcibiades who had suggested this course of action to Pericles, and it was Pericles' political rivals who had sought to expose him. Ephoros claims that in order to create the war, Pericles issued the Megarian Decree, which excluded the Megarians from harbors controlled by Athens. The Spartans demanded that Athens rescind this prohibition, and Pericles then provoked the Athenians to war by describing the extent of her economic and military capabilities and linking obedience to Sparta with enslavement. Thus persuaded, the Athenian people made preparations for war and the Peloponnesian League voted to seek a military solution to the dispute. Ephoros believed that human actors and interests played a controlling role in bringing about the war.

The contrast between the two historians is striking. Thucydides saw the war as the natural and inevitable result of the accumulation of power. For Ephoros, the war was the completely avoidable result of human actions. Ephoros is clearly seeking to elucidate a different point than Thucydides. The differences between Thucydides' and Ephoros' views on the causation of the Peloponnesian War make it obvious that Ephoros granted individuals greater historical agency in specific historical developments than did his predecessor.

² For this thesis, fragments are identified according to Jacoby's *Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*. Jacoby grouped the extant remains of each fragmentary historian's work together; the references to Ephoros and his work are compiled in entry 70. These references are further divided into fragments, which cite Ephoros as a source for historical information or provide details concerning Ephoros' historiographic method, and *testimonia*, which mention Ephoros' life or broader details of his works as a whole.

More significantly, individuals also lie at the root of Ephoros' larger historical theory. Like many Greek historians, Ephoros sought to demonstrate the operation of underlying, universal principles that explained the overall path of history. The theory articulated in his *Histories* holds that luxury and greed weaken the character of a state. In order to prevent this, a state needed a *politeia*³ that ensured freedom through the institutionalization of education and discipline that together produced a unified population and eliminated luxury and greed from the population. A side effect of the quest for freedom was the acquisition of hegemony.

This brings us back to the issue of historical agency because Ephoros portrayed *politeiai* as the creations of specific individuals. The centrality of *politeiai* to the *Histories* suggests that individuals responsible for shaping *politeiai* are also central to Ephoros' view of history. For the purposes of this thesis, the idea of historical agency does not refer to the capability of men to make independent decisions, but rather to the capacity of individuals to fundamentally reshape the established order of their world. It is important to keep in mind that for Ephoros these individuals, by establishing *politeiai*, played a key role in defining the later history of their communities, and in some cases, such as Lycurgus, of much of the Greek world.

This definition excludes otherwise important men such as Pericles, who for Thucydides was instrumental in deciding Athenian strategy during the early stages of the Peloponnesian War and for Ephoros was pivotal in explaining the outbreak of that war. Even though he was significant for both authors, neither portrayed him as an individual who radically reordered the Greek world. This more restrictive definition of historical agency is required because important

³ Several transliterated words will occur repeatedly throughout this thesis. These words are either central to understanding Ephoros' historical theory, as they occur throughout the fragments and are thus likely to represent his actual words rather than those of later authors, or do not permit concise and accurate translations into English. Short definitions for key terms are provided parenthetically; when necessary, longer definitions are instead provided in the footnotes. *Politeia* refers to a state's legal constitution and overall way of life.

individuals are present throughout Greek historical literature, yet clearly Ephoros differed from his predecessors in terms of the degree of agency he granted to a select few.

This thesis is an examination of the role individuals play within the *Histories*. It consists of three main sections. In the first, I provide a brief biography of Ephoros and an introduction to the use of theory by historians in ancient Greece. I then proceed to examine four individuals who play a large role in the *Histories*: Lycurgus, Lysander, Rhadamanthys, and Epameinondas. I detail the portrayal of each of these individuals in Greek literature that predates Ephoros before discussing what Ephoros saw as their role in Greek history. Finally, I discuss Ephoros' place within a broader literary and historical context in which individuals played more prominent roles than they previously had in Greek history. When placed in context, Ephoros' *Histories* are shown to be part of a larger literary movement that recognized the increased influence demonstrated by leaders during the fourth century.

The Life, Times, Works and Reputation of Ephoros

The ancient biographical tradition concerning Ephoros, though possibly of dubious accuracy, provides a range of details about his life. The relevant sources claim that Ephoros was born during the 93rd Olympiad (408) in Kyme, was the son of either Demophilos or Antiochos, and had at least one son, also named Demophilos (T1 *apud* Suidas *s.v.* *Ephippos*).⁴ The date of his death is not given in the *testimonia*. The latest event recorded in the *Histories* is the siege of Perinthus in 341/0 BCE, a date that serves as a *terminus post quem* for Ephoros' death.⁵ Many *testimonia* indicate he was a student of Isocrates, displayed a natural affinity for historical work, and needed a spur in his historical writing to give him intensity for his work (e.g., T2a *apud* Strabo 13.3.6, T3b *apud* Cicero *De Oratore* 2.57,⁶ T28a *apud* Suidas *s.v.* *Ephoros Kymaios*). As an indication of the uncertainty concerning Ephoros that existed even in antiquity, one *testimonium* claims that Ephoros left Isocrates' school having learned nothing and his father forced him to return—hardly the eager student portrayed elsewhere (T4 *apud* [Plutarch] *Vitae X Oratorum* 839a). The *testimonia* that link him to Isocrates also connect him with the historian Theopompos, his contemporary, who was said to be a fellow student of Isocrates. However, recent scholarship has called both his and Theopompos' status as Isocrates' pupils into question.⁷ Finally, one *testimonium* states that Ephoros turned down an invitation to join Alexander's expedition (T6 *apud* Plutarch *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis* 1043d). While the specifics of his life cannot be determined with a high degree of certainty from the *testimonia*, some details can

⁴ With the exception of references to modern scholarship, all dates are BCE unless otherwise noted.

⁵ Demophilos wrote the final book of the *Histories*; his work addressed the Third Sacred War, meaning that Ephoros himself described the siege of Perinthus.

⁶ Cicero provides additional details at 2.94 and 3.36 that were not included by Jacoby as *testimonia*.

⁷ Flower 1994, 42-52.

reliably be established: Ephoros was alive in the second half of the fourth century and was born in Kyme.

The most significant of Ephoros' works is the *Histories*. The narrative in the *Histories* covered events all over the Greek world and among non-Greeks insofar as they interacted with Greeks. The *Histories* was thus the first of what Greeks somewhat misleadingly called "universal histories" (T7 *apud* Polybius 5.33.2). It ran from the Return of the Herakleidai, dated by Ephoros to 1069/8, to the siege of Perinthus in 341/0. Ephoros set the Return of the Herakleidai as the boundary between the mythological and historical eras and hence the starting point of his work (T8 *apud* Diodorus 4.1.2 and T10 *apud* Diodorus 16.75.5).⁸ The *Histories* consisted of thirty books; Ephoros himself wrote the first twenty-nine books, while the thirtieth book was added by his son Demophilos (T9a *apud* Diodorus 16.14.3 and T9b *apud* Athenaeus 232d). Ephoros was the first ancient historian to divide his own work into books, and he took the additional step of writing a preface for each book. The narrative was structured *kata genos*, which should be taken to mean that each book focused on a specific historical period in one of four geographic areas: mainland Greece, western Greece/Sicily, Asia, or Macedon (T1 *apud* Suidas *s.v.* *Ephippos*, T10 *apud* Diodorus 16.75.5, and T11 *apud* Diodorus 5.1.4).⁹

⁸ The Suda states that Ephoros began the *Histories* at the Fall of Troy (T1 *apud* Suidas *s.v.* *Ephippos*). The majority of modern scholarship accepts Diodorus' date instead. Parmeggiani (1999) has examined the meaning of the division between mythological and historical periods. A number of fragments of the *Histories* discuss Greece prior to the Return of the Herakleidai, calling Diodorus' account into question. Parmeggiani argues that Ephoros did not devote clearly distinguished narrative space to the mythological period and that the key contrast between the periods was between myth and truth. Sections that discuss events prior to the Return show that Ephoros examined myths dated to this period in search of underlying truths that were consistent with what he viewed as historical patterns.

⁹ The single most important article on the interpretation of *kata genos* is Drews 1963. See also Jacoby 1923-1958, 2c: 27 and Drews 1976. For alternative interpretations of the meaning of *kata genos*, see Busolt 1893-1904 vol. 1, Schwartz 1906, Laqueur 1911, Walker 1919, Barber 1935, Bloch 1940, Breitenbach 1970, and Meister 1971. Barber believed Jacoby's translation of *kata*

As was the case with many fourth-century historians, Ephoros wrote extensively on a number of varied topics. The Suda lists works titled *On Good and Evil*, *Paradoxes from All Over*, *Inventions and How Each Invented Them*, and other unnamed volumes (T1 *apud* Suidas *s.v.* *Ephippos*, see also T2a *apud* Strabo 13.3.6), while pseudo-Plutarch adds the *History of Our Homeland* (F1 *apud* Plutarch *Vita Homeri* 1.2). It is generally accepted by modern scholars that, in addition to the *Histories*, Ephoros wrote a history of Kyme, a book on inventions, and a book on style.¹⁰ The other works are likely to have been figments of the Byzantine scholarly imagination. All of these works have received less attention in modern scholarship than the *Histories* and are not studied as a part of this thesis.

In antiquity Ephoros' work was, with a few exceptions, quite warmly received. Some accused him of plagiarism (T17 *apud* Porphyry in Eusebius *Praeparatio Evangelica* 10.3) and others, notably the later historian Timaeus, attacked his work on grounds ranging from style to source criticism (e.g., T23 *apud* Polybius 12.28.10 and T26 *apud* Hermogenes 2.12). His knowledge of distant lands that he certainly did not visit was called into question by later authors (T14a *apud* Josephus *Contra Apionem* 1.67). When the attacks come from another historian, we must take into account the tradition in ancient Greek historiography of condemning one's predecessors, as it is a likely cause of much of the criticism.¹¹ In contrast, Polybius, who was not notably kind to other historians, declared Ephoros to be "admirable throughout his whole work in

genos was inaccurate: "It is, in fact, absurd to hope to give an intelligible account of the interrelated countries by keeping them separate in water-tight compartments." Instead, he translated the term as "on a subject-system," meaning that each book was a discussion of a unified subject, such as the Persian Wars or the Pentekontaetia (17-21). Busolt (158), Schwartz (col. 4), Laqueur (198 and 349), and Meister argued that each book was unified in theme. Laqueur (354) also advanced the idea that *kata genos* could mean that the books were organized by episodes. Walker (248) further developed this idea and Bloch (1: 308 ff.) and Breitenbach (col. 413) followed him.

¹⁰ Meister 2002-b, 1035.

¹¹ Marincola 1997, 217-236.

style, treatment, and argumentative acuteness” (T23 *apud* Polybius 12.28.10, trans. Evelyn Shuckburgh). He did, however, criticize Ephoros’ knowledge of techniques of land warfare while praising his descriptions of naval combat (T20 *apud* Polybius 12.25). A number of *testimonia* describe Ephoros as a reliable source for many geographic details (e.g., T32 *apud* Skymnos *Orb. Descr.* 109 and T33a-d *apud* Pliny *Naturalis Historia* 1.4-7). As further indication of his prominence among Greek authors, a late-antique list of the ten leading historians includes Ephoros alongside such notable figures as Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Polybius (T34 *apud* Listen d. griech. Profanschrift. Tab. C 51 (Rabe, *Rh. Mus.* LXV 339)). Cicero described Ephoros and Theopompos as *duo praestantes ingenio* (T3b *apud* Cicero *De Oratore* 2.57), and Diodorus claims that “Ephoros...in the universal history which he composed has achieved success, not alone in the style of his composition, but also as regards the arrangement of his work” (T11 *apud* Diodorus 5.1.4, trans. C. H. Oldfather).

None of Ephoros’ works have survived intact, and modern scholarship must rely on *testimonia* and fragments found in later authors. As part of his monumental collection of the works of the fragmentary historians, *Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, Felix Jacoby compiled 34 *testimonia* and 236 fragments that can be attributed with some degree of certainty to Ephoros. However, the infrequent use of citations by ancient authors almost certainly means far more remains of his work than what was compiled by Jacoby.¹² The identification of those fragments requires extensive scholarship and will only be addressed in this thesis when a possible fragment provides further insight relevant to Ephoros’ views on the role of the individual in his conception of history.

¹² Christesen, “Spartans and Scythians, a Meeting of Mirages: The Portrayal of the Lycurgan *Politeia* in Ephoros’ *Histories*,” forthcoming.

The *Histories* has received relatively little attention from modern scholars. While initial early-modern studies of the *Histories* were favorable, Ephoros' work rapidly became the subject of harsh criticism.¹³ This criticism was to a large extent based on the assumption that Books 11-15 of Diodorus Siculus' *Bibliothēke Historikē* were a virtually verbatim copy of Ephoros' *Histories* and that the latter could thus be evaluated on the basis of the former.¹⁴ Distaste for Diodorus' sometimes sloppy and uninspired work carried over into the scholarship on Ephoros, much of which was, as a result, almost improbably vituperative. Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, a prominent late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century German philologist who shaped the early study of ancient historiography, delivered a lecture on Greek historical writing in 1908 which provides a good example of the widely felt contempt for Ephoros:

Ephoros, an utterly thoughtless writer, has at best the doubtful merit of having been the first to compose a Universal History. . . . He mastered a great mass of material, and, inasmuch as he made it trivial, succeeded the better in making it homogenous. He "pragmatized" history, as they call it; that is, he took care that everything should run on such lines as an enlightened Philistine can at a pinch imagine. He also took care that the moral and patriotic feelings of the public should in the end receive the satisfaction which they expect in the fifth act of a bad tragedy. Where the tradition resisted, he brought it to reason with a firm hand. We can be sure of our facts in this, because just those parts of his work are specially well known to us, in which he simply bases himself upon Herodotus and Thucydides. There is nothing in them of any value, except a few additional facts taken from other writers.¹⁵

The opinion that Ephoros was "the incarnation of everything that was objectionable in Greek historiography"¹⁶ severely curtailed scholarly investigation of Ephoros' works. Godfrey Barber's 1935 work, *The Historian Ephorus*, is the only book-length study of Ephoros in English that was published in the twentieth century. In keeping with the negative opinion prevalent at this time,

¹³ See Schepens 1977b, 99 for the change in early modern reception of Ephoros.

¹⁴ Wickersham 1994, 151.

¹⁵ Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1908, 10-11.

¹⁶ Fornara 1983, 42 n. 63.

Barber concluded that Ephoros relied on untrustworthy sources, had little historical acumen, and was only read in the ancient world because he produced the first universal history.¹⁷

Renewed interest in Ephoros' work emerged in the 1970s. That interest was in large part driven by the realization that Diodorus' narrative was very much his own work and was far from being a direct copy of Ephoros. That realization dealt a fatal blow to the assumption that Books 11-15 of Diodorus' *Bibliothēke Historikē* were directly copied from Ephoros' *Historiēs*.¹⁸

Kenneth Sacks' 1994 analysis of Diodorus was the culmination of this research; Sacks concluded that there was a continuity of style between Books 11-15 and the remainder of Diodorus' writings where Ephoros was not used as a source, thus indicating that Diodorus exercised authorial judgment in presenting his narrative.¹⁹ It is no longer acceptable to reconstruct Ephoros' *Historiēs* by simply reading Diodorus.

Since the 1970s there has been a small but constant flow of new scholarship on the *Historiēs*. The first pieces of the new scholarship on Ephoros were produced by Guido Schepens starting in 1970. Schepens began to rehabilitate Ephoros' reputation as an historian and prompted a wider reconsideration of the *Historiēs*.²⁰ More recently, John Wickersham's book *Hegemony in the Greek Historians* elucidated the organization of Ephoros' narrative. He argued that Ephoros was the first historian who considered hegemony a topic worthy of comprehensive examination.²¹ Wickersham demonstrated that Ephoros organized his history around successive hegemonies that gained their position of power based on geography, education, culture, and

¹⁷ Barber 1935, 156-158.

¹⁸ See Wickersham 1994, 164-169 for a summary of this scholarship.

¹⁹ Sacks 1994, 213-232. Additional scholarship on the style of Diodorus is summarized in Wickersham 1994, 169-176.

²⁰ See Schepens 1970; Schepens 1977a; Schepens 1977b; and Schepens 1987.

²¹ Wickersham 1994, 127.

politeia.²² Additionally, he showed that the negative opinions expressed by Barber all drew on passages where Barber read sections of Diodorus as unattributed passages from Ephoros, whereas the commentary based upon clearly attributed fragments of Ephoros was largely laudatory.²³

Two other scholars, Victor Parker and Giovanni Parmeggiani, have recently also contributed to the study of Ephoros. Parker has made the case that Ephoros demonstrated great acuity in collecting and analyzing sources and that as a result Ephoros' narrative constitutes an important source for the fourth century.²⁴ He is currently writing the entry on Ephoros for the *Brill's New Jacoby* and producing the first complete English translation of the fragments. Parmeggiani wrote a Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Bologna in 1998 on Ephoros, portions of which have since been published as a series of articles on Ephoros' conception of history and myth,²⁵ his use of Miletus to establish a paradigm of the fall of a state,²⁶ the role of genealogies and chronology in the *Histories*,²⁷ and Ephoros' view of the role of *isotimia* in the fall of Sparta.²⁸ Parmeggiani's analysis of Ephoros' beliefs concerning *isotimia* also traces the actions of several powerful individuals in Spartan history as described in the *Histories*. The serious treatment of Ephoros' work and consideration of its merits by Parker and Parmeggiani is indicative of the greater respect accorded to Ephoros as a historian in recent decades.

²² Wickersham 1994, 119-150.

²³ Wickersham 1994, 152.

²⁴ Parker 2004. S also Parker 2001. It should be noted that Parker frequently assumes that Diodorus was a reliable compiler of Ephoros and treats some passages of Diodorus where Ephoros is not explicitly cited as if they were quotations of Ephoros.

²⁵ Parmeggiani 1999, Parmeggiani 2001.

²⁶ Parmeggiani 2000.

²⁷ Parmeggiani 2003.

²⁸ Parmeggiani 2004.

Theory in Greek Historiography

A number of ancient Greek historians starting with Herodotus made use of universalizing theories to explain historical processes and, in this regard, Ephoros is similar to his predecessors. Herodotus wrote about the rise and fall of states and adopted theories that emphasized the role of factors such as geography and culture. Thucydides viewed human nature as an inherently violent force that must be restrained by laws and customs in order for society to function. For Ephoros, history is a diadochy of hegemonies, and the *politeia* of a state determines its fate.

The rise and fall of powerful kingdoms, especially those whose power enables them to establish hegemony in the Middle East, is a central topic in Herodotus.²⁹ He declares that his work will cover both weak and powerful states because “those that were great in earlier times most have now become small, and those that were great...were small in the time before” (1.5, trans. David Grene). The conquests of Sesostris (2.103-110), the history of the Assyrian empire (1.95), the emergence of the Median empire (1.96-130), the Lydian empire (1.1-1.94) and the conquest and dominion of Asia by the Scythians (1.104-106) are all treated at some length, and the centerpiece of Herodotus’ work is the history of Persian power.

In explaining the ascent and decline of hegemonic powers, Herodotus used a number of theoretical approaches, the most important of which concern geography and culture and their effect on character. According to Herodotus, rugged and poor countries produced men capable of creating and maintaining a hegemonic state. Polities which are “backward, poor, unwelcoming, lacking in strong central government and vigorously independent” are hard and thus able to gain power, while soft states are “civilized, wealthy, and seductive, often ruled by absolute monarchs

²⁹ Luce 1997, 15-17 and Wickersham 1994, 20-22.

and vulnerable to conquest from without.”³⁰ A hard nation is typically a product of rough terrain and an austere culture, while a soft nation results from fertile terrain or luxurious culture. The clearest statement of the importance of geography occurs when the Persians urge Cyrus to consider moving from the mountains into more hospitable lands:

When Cyrus heard that, he was not amazed at their argument, but said that they should do as they said; but in that case they should prepare to be no longer those who rule but those who would be ruled. “From soft countries come soft men. It is not possible that from the same land stems a growth of wondrous fruit and men who are good soldiers.” So the Persians took this to heart and went away; their judgment had been overcome by that of Cyrus, and they chose to rule, living in a wretched land, rather than to sow the level plains and be slaves to others (Herodotus 9.122, trans. D. Grene).

The role of culture is emphasized by Croesus when he advises Cyrus on how to solidify his rule over the Lydians. Croesus suggests that a transition to an effete culture will prevent the conquered Lydians from reemerging as a threat to the Persians:

...send them an injunction that they carry no more arms; bid them wear tunics under their cloaks and soft slippers on their feet; and give them orders that they themselves shall play the flute and the lyre and educate their children to be shopkeepers. Soon enough, my lord, you shall see them become women instead of men, so that they will be no further threat to you as rebels (1.155).

For Herodotus, people who possess the requisite character to gain and maintain power live a simple lifestyle in less-than-notably fertile lands.³¹

Herodotus also draws on the ideas, evidently widely held among Greeks, that excessive wealth and pride are dangerous and that the gods balance the *kosmos* and combines these ideas into a historical pattern. He sees a repeated pattern which begins with an excessive accumulation of wealth and success (*koros*, literally satiety), which then tends to breed insolence (*hybris*) in individuals and states. Often an advisory figure provides words of caution, which are rejected.

³⁰ Luce 1997, 57.

³¹ There is a substantial bibliography on Herodotus' conception of geography and hard versus soft nations. See Lateiner 1986, 16; Luce 1997, 28-31, 57-58; Raaflaub 2002, 161-162, 171-172; Redfield 1985, 109-112; Thomas 2000, 103-114; and works cited therein for further information.

Pride causes the individual or state to transgress the boundaries of proper mortal behavior

(*moira*) thus bringing about destruction (*ate*).³² Artabanus' advice to Xerxes is the most succinct statement of this process:

Do you see how it is the living things that exceed others in size that the god strikes with lightning and will not let them show their grandeur, while little ones do not itch the god to action? Do you see how it is always the greatest houses and the tallest trees that the god hurls his bolts upon? For the god loves to thwart whatever is greater than the rest (7.10).

Whenever the success of an individual disturbs the balance of the *kosmos*, the gods intervene.

This pattern is evident throughout the *History*; it appears in the lives of the Persian kings (Cyrus, Cambyses, Darius, and Xerxes) as well as in the stories of Croesus (Book 1), Candaules (1.7-12), and Polycrates (3.39-43).

Thucydides, under the influence of medical writers, uses universalizing theories to explain the events of the Peloponnesian War. Medical writers were a strong presence in Thucydides' intellectual milieu,³³ and their importance is seen in the historian's tendency to seek the underlying causes of historical events in traits shared by all humans. Thucydides saw human nature as a constant that played a key role in shaping history.³⁴

For Thucydides, *physis* (human nature) was an inherently destructive force that required constraints in the form of *nomoi* and that emerged when unrest disrupted the established order of

³² As with his opinion concerning geography, the bibliography on Herodotus' views concerning wealth and *koros-hybris-ate* is vast. See especially Fornara 1971, 77-78; Luce 1997, 55-56; Munson 2001, 199-200; Raaflaub 2002, 171-176; Redfield 1985, 112-115; and the works cited therein. See Gould 1989, 76-82 for the view that the pattern of *hybris* and punishment constitutes a set of metaphors rather than a unified theory.

³³ See Thomas 2006, 92-108 and Luce 1997, 81-92 and the works cited therein. Thucydides employed both the vocabulary and techniques of the medical writers, though with some degree of modification to suit his subject matter.

³⁴ As is the case with Herodotus, the relevant bibliography on Thucydides' methods and theories is vast. See especially Hunter 1973, 141-2; Luce 1997, 86-92; Raaflaub 2002, 150-152; Reinhold 1985; and the works cited therein. This view of Thucydides' conception of *physis* is not uniformly accepted. See, for example, Price 2001, 27-8, 37, who argues that external stimuli, not *physis*, determines human behavior in Thucydides' work.

society.³⁵ Thucydides presents a rather bleak view of human nature, one in which humans display not justice or even rational self-interest, but rather a radical, almost incomprehensible desire to provide for nothing but their own security and a concomitant willingness to do anything to obtain it. During periods of upheaval, *nomoi* break down and humans act, frequently violently, to secure their individual interests.

Thucydides' views on human nature and its effect on historical process are most evident in his description of the plague in Athens and of the *stasis* in Corcyra. Thucydides writes that the plague marked "the beginnings of a state of unprecedented lawlessness (*anomia*)" that was characterized by self-indulgence without concern for the well-being of other citizens, the anger of the gods, or the laws of man (2.53, trans. Rex Warner). The chaos of the plague produced a situation in which people lacked any fear of punishment for violating the law. Similarly, the *stasis* in Corcyra was marked by the breakdown of *nomoi* and attendant chaos and violence:

Then, with the ordinary conventions of civilized life thrown into confusion, human nature [*anthropeia physis*], always ready to offend even where laws [*nomoi*] exist, showed itself proudly in its true colours, as something incapable of controlling passion, insubordinate to the idea of justice, the enemy to anything superior to itself; for, if it had not been for the pernicious power of envy, men would not have so exalted vengeance above innocence and profit above justice (3.84).

Thucydides also uses the example of the Corcyraean *stasis* as the basis of a generalized view of human nature and of history:³⁶

In the various cities these revolutions were the cause of many calamities—as happens and always will happen while human nature [*physis anthropon*] is what it is, though there may be different degrees of savagery, and, as different circumstances arise, the general rules will admit of some variety. In times of peace and prosperity cities and individuals alike follow higher standards, because they are not forced into a situation where they have to do what they do not want to do. But war is a stern teacher; in depriving them of the power of easily satisfying their daily wants, it brings most people's minds down to the level of their actual circumstances (3.82).

³⁵ *Nomoi* are legal codes as well as the habits and norms of a culture.

³⁶ Luce 1997, 76-79.

The force of *physis* is powerful enough that Thucydides believes its reemergence during periods of extended conflict is inevitable. Indeed, he declares the purposes of his work are to make his readers understand that the underlying causes of the conflict will return and to better prepare them for those times:

It will be enough for me, however, if these words of mine are judged useful by those who want to understand clearly the events which happened in the past and which (human nature [*to anthropinon*] being what it is) will, at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future. My work is not a piece of writing designed to meet the taste of an immediate public, but was done to last for ever (1.22).

Thucydides' narrative of the events of the Peloponnesian War was a vehicle for the exploration of human nature and an attempt to prepare future generations for the problems faced in his time by equipping his readers with predictive intelligence.

In his use of universalizing theory, Ephoros fits firmly within this historiographic tradition. Ephoros sought to explain the rise and fall of hegemonic polities and employed universalizing theories for that purpose.³⁷ Ephoros viewed geography as a factor in the rise of hegemonic states, but his theories ultimately focus on the *politeia*; he saw hegemony as the product of a healthy and well-designed *politeia*. According to Ephoros, the purpose of a *politeia* was to promote *eleutheria* (freedom). This goal was achieved by means of inculcating proper *paideia* (education) and *agoge* (discipline), which in turn fostered a self-restrained and austere lifestyle. That in turn produced *homonoia* (harmony) and *andreia* (courage). These characteristics were necessary if a state was to avoid the enervating influence of *tryphe* (luxury)

³⁷ Wickersham 1994, 119-50. The concept of successive hegemonies draws mainly from F118 (*apud* Strabo 8.5.5) in which Ephoros describes the Lycurgan reforms as granting the Lacedaemonians hegemony over Greece and then goes on to describe the rise and fall of Thebes and Macedon. Strabo continues this succession of hegemonies by adding the Roman conquest of Greece to the list.

and *pleonexia* (greed). Hegemony was not the goal of a *politeia*, but since freedom required the absence of outside constraint, truly free states were almost by necessity hegemony.

There are two extant fragments that clearly present Ephoros' views on geography and hegemony. Strabo preserves Ephoros' description of the geography of Boeotia, and here we see a very different perception of geography than that found in Herodotus:³⁸

Ephoros declares that Boeotia is superior to the countries of the bordering tribes, not only in fertility of soil, but also because it alone has three seas and has a greater number of good harbors; in the Crisaean and Corinthian Gulfs it receives the products of Italy and Sicily and Libya, while in the part which faces Euboea, since its seaboard branches off on either side of the Euripus, on one side towards Aulis and the territory of Tanagra and on the other towards Salganeus and Anthedon, the sea stretches unbroken in the one direction towards Egypt and Cyprus and the islands, and in the other direction towards Macedonia and the regions of the Propontis and the Hellespont. And he adds that Euboea has, in a way, been made a part of Boeotia by the Euripus, since the Euripus is so narrow and is spanned by a bridge to Euboea only two *plethra* long. Now he praises the country on account of these things; and he says that it is naturally well suited to hegemony, but that those who were from time to time its leaders neglected careful training [*agoge*] and education [*paideia*], and therefore, although they at times achieved success, they maintained it only for a short time, as is shown in the case of Epameinondas; for after he died the Thebans immediately lost the hegemony, having had only a taste of it; and that the cause of this was the fact that they belittled the value of learning and of intercourse with mankind, and cared for the military virtues alone [*kata polemon aretes*] (F119 *apud* Strabo 9.2.2, trans. H. L. Jones).

Whereas for Herodotus "fertility of soil" would be a geographic liability because of its softening effects, for Ephoros it becomes an asset. The strategic advantage of location makes it possible for Boeotia to import goods from the entirety of the Mediterranean world, thus ensuring her access to necessary materiel.³⁹

³⁸ As will become apparent, Ephoros believed the Spartans held hegemony for over three-quarters of the years covered in the *Histories*. His treatment of the geography of Laconia would, therefore, be pivotal to understanding the interaction between hegemony and geography. Unfortunately, his description of Laconia has not survived. Strabo, who made heavy use of Ephoros, does describe the topography of the Peloponnesian peninsula as naturally suited to hegemony (8.1.3). Interestingly, for Strabo the benefits of the geography are strategic, not cultural as in Herodotus and the medical writers. As we will see, this description bears a striking resemblance to Ephoros; it seems very likely that Strabo is using Ephoros' work here.

³⁹ Wickersham 1994, 129-30.

Ephoros' description of the Aetolians further supports this reading of the relationship between geography and power. In this case the country is rugged, but its ruggedness is not linked to military skill:

Ephoros, after saying that the Aetolians were a race which had never become subject to any other people, but throughout all time of which there is any record had remained undevastated, both because of the ruggedness of their country and because of their training in warfare [*periton polemon askesin*], says at the outset that the Curetes held possession of the whole country, but when Aetolus, the son of Endymion, arrived from Elis and overpowered them in war, the Curetes withdrew to what is now called Acarnania, whereas the Aetolians came back with Epeians and founded the earliest of the cities of Aetolia, and in the tenth generation after that Elis was settled by Oxylus the son of Haemon, who had crossed over from Aetolia (F122a *apud* Strabo 10.3.2).

The terrain is one of two reasons given for the Aetolians' ability to remain unconquered, the other being military skill. There is no sense that military prowess is the byproduct of geography, and it thus should not be seen as a dependent factor. Again, topography is a strategic advantage, in this case because mountainous terrain is difficult to conquer.

Both of these fragments portray geography as a contributory rather than a decisive factor in the ability of a state to establish hegemony. Despite their strategically advantageous position, the Boeotians are unable to achieve hegemony because they neglect *agoge* and *paideia*. In contrast, the Aetolians train properly and are able to take advantage of their natural position.

Ephoros understood the nature of a state's *politeia* as being the key to its hegemonic potential. A healthy *politeia*, one in which proper *paideia* and *agoge* caused men to live a simple lifestyle, produced unity and bravery and ultimately resulted in a free state. The strongest evidence for this is found in Ephoros' discussion of Crete:

As for their [the Cretans'] *politeia*, which is described by Ephoros, it may suffice to run through its most important provisions. The lawgiver, he says, seems to assume that *eleutheria* is the greatest good for *poleis*. For this alone makes good things [*ta agatha*] belong specifically to those who acquired them, whereas in a condition of slavery those good things belong to the rulers but not to the ruled. But it is necessary for those who have *eleutheria* to guard it. [----] *Homonoia* appears when dissension, which is the result of greed [*pleonexia*]

and luxury [*tryphe*], is removed. All those who live in a self-restrained [*sophronos*] and simple manner encounter neither envy [*phthonos*] nor *hybris* nor hatred towards those who are like them [*homoioi*]. This is why he commanded the boys to frequent the *agelai* as they are called, and the adult men to eat together in *syssitia*, which they call *andreia*,⁴⁰ so that the poorer, being fed at public expense, might have an equal share with the well-to-do. In order that *andreia* and not cowardice might prevail, he ordered that they be accustomed from boyhood to arms and toils, so that they would think nothing of burning heat and cold and steep, rugged roads and blows received in gymnasia and in regular battles. He also ordered that they be trained in both archery and in the war-dance, which the Curetes first discovered and later also the man who put in order the Pyrrhic dance, which took its name from him, so that not even their games were without a share in those things that are useful in war... (F149 *apud* Strabo 10.4.16, trans. P. Christesen).

A successful *politeia*, then, sought to protect the *eleutheria* of the citizens. This was accomplished by eliminating luxury and by promoting austerity, which created egalitarian unity within the state. The citizens of this unified state were educated and trained in such a way as to make them brave soldiers.⁴¹

The same idea that austerity strengthens a state can be seen in fragment F42 (*apud* Strabo 7.3.9). Here the Scythians' simple lifestyle is directly responsible for creating a harmonious society and ensuring their freedom:

Then Ephorus reasons that since they are frugal with respect to their *diaita* and are not interested in money they behave in a well-ordered fashion toward one another, holding all things in common, both all the rest of their things and their wives and children and all their relatives, and they are invincible and unconquered by outsiders, because they have nothing that would make them worth enslaving (trans. P. Christesen).

The absence of luxury and shared ownership produces harmony within the state, reducing the potential for destructive internal strife. It also contributes to the Scythians' independence by reducing the reasons for aggression against them.⁴²

⁴⁰ We should note the two different meanings of *andreia* used here. Ephorus relates that the Cretans called their dining halls *andreia* and that the Cretans possessed *andreia* as a characteristic of their people.

⁴¹ Christesen, "Spartans and Scythians".

⁴² Pownall 2004, 130 and Christesen, "Spartans and Scythians" have noted that the communal living of the Scythians described here strongly resembles Sparta under the laws of Lycurgus.

Ephoros uses his ideas about *politeiai* to explain the beginnings of the most important hegemony within the bounds of the narrative in the *Histories*, that of Sparta. This is seen in F118 (*apud* Strabo 8.5.5):

Those who had gained possession of Laconia from the start exercised self-restraint, but after they entrusted the *politeia* to Lycurgus, they surpassed the rest to such an extent that they alone of the Greeks ruled over both land and sea, and they continued ruling the Greeks until the Thebans, and immediately after them the Macedonians, took their hegemony from them (trans. P. Christesen).

The strength of the Lycurgan *politeia* ensured Spartan hegemony for centuries.

Diodorus provides further support of this reading of Ephoros. Book 7 of the *Bibliothēke Historike* includes a treatment of Lycurgus' visit to the Delphic oracle to inquire about what sort of laws he should craft for Sparta. It reads as follows:

The main point [of the oracle] was that it was necessary to give the most careful forethought to *homonoia* and *andreia*, since it is by these alone that it is possible to preserve *eleutheria*, without which nothing anyone possesses is useful to him nor any other thing from among those things considered to be *agatha*⁴³ by most men, seeing that he is subjected to others. For all such things belong to the rulers, not to the ruled. As a result, if anyone wishes to acquire *agatha* for himself and not for others, it is necessary first to prepare *eleutheria* (7.12.3, trans. P. Christesen).

This passage comes from a relatively long discussion of Lycurgus and the Lycurgan *politeia* (running from 7.12.1-8) which likely draws on a number of different sources. This particular section of text, however, is so similar to the attributed fragments of Ephoros that it is almost certainly directly based on the *Histories*.⁴⁴ As is the case in F149, *homonoia* and *andreia* work in tandem to ensure the freedom of the citizenry. One might also note that the connection between hegemony and *eleutheria* is more evident here than in the previously cited fragments. The free individual or state is, by definition, not subjected to others.

⁴³ *Ta agatha* should be read as referring to both material and non-material goods, with emphasis on the non-material. See Christesen, "Spartans and Scythians".

⁴⁴ See Meyer 1892, 1: 220-221; Jacoby 1923-1958, 2c: 79, 84; and Christesen, "Spartans and Scythians".

Just as Ephoros believed austerity was necessary for a healthy *politeia*, he saw wealth and luxury as dangers capable of destroying a hegemon's power. The corrupting influence of wealth is a commonplace in Greek historiography, and Ephoros is no exception. F183 (*apud* Athenaeus 523e) provides a clear outline of Ephoros' views on the damage wealth inflicts upon a society. Here Ephoros recounts the success of Miletus and clearly links the loss of her power to the growth of *tryphe* within her society:

But the Milesians, as long as they abstained from luxury [*ouk etrouphon*], conquered the Scythians, as Ephorus says, and both founded the cities on the Hellespont and settled the Black Sea region with famous cities, and everyone hastened to Miletus. But when they were conquered by pleasure [*hedone*] and luxury [*tryphe*], the *andreion* of the city was put to flight, as Aristotle says, and a certain proverb was based on them, "Once upon a time long ago the Milesians were brave" (trans P. Christesen).

For Ephoros *tryphe* could not coexist with *andreia*.⁴⁵

F149 (*apud* Strabo 10.4.16) shows that Ephoros also portrayed *tryphe* as leading to *hybris*. *Hybris* does not, however, play the same role as in Herodotus' narrative because it weakens internal cohesion instead of inviting divine retribution:

Homonoia appears when dissension, which is the result of greed [*pleonexia*] and luxury [*tryphe*], is removed. All those who live in a self-restrained [*sophronos*] and simple manner encounter neither envy [*phthonos*] nor *hybris* nor hatred towards those who are like them [*homoioi*] (trans. P. Christesen).

For Ephoros, historical causality is to be found in the relationships between men, not the intervention of the divine.

⁴⁵ Parmeggiani 2000, 86-89. Gorman and Gorman 2007, using a case study of Sybaris, argue that the historiographical tradition of using wealth to explain the decline of states is a late development, and suggest that Athenaeus (c. 190 AD) developed this causal theory. This is certainly not the case with Ephoros. Fragments found in a number of authors, in addition to those found in Athenaeus, discuss the negative impact of wealth, greed, and luxury (e.g., F148 *apud* Polybius 6.45.1-10, F149 *apud* Strabo 10.4.16, F205 *apud* Plutarch *Lysander* 17.1-2). Furthermore, Gorman and Gorman focus on wealth as causing *hybris* and inviting divine retribution, whereas Ephoros primarily viewed wealth as weakening the character of a society.

An unattributed passage found in Diodorus' *Bibliothēke Historike* is helpful in further reconstructing Ephoros' narrative. At the end of his discussion of Lycurgus' life and work as a lawgiver, Diodorus attributes the decline of the Spartan state to the gradual abandonment of the laws of Lycurgus:

The Lacedaimonians, making use of the laws of Lycurgus, starting from a humble position became the most powerful of the Greeks and maintained their hegemony for more than 400 years. But afterward, on account of little by little neglecting each of Lycurgus' laws and turning toward *tryphe* and relaxation [*rathymia*], and becoming so corrupted as to use coined money and to amass wealth, they lost their hegemony (7.12.8, trans. P. Christesen).

Wealth began to enter into the Spartan state and the Spartans lost their hegemony. Prior to this, the austere Lycurgan *politeia* had secured Spartan hegemony. Similarity in terminology and in the duration of the hegemony assigned to the Spartans (the 500 years of Spartan hegemony recognized by Ephoros probably became 400 in Diodorus due to corruption in the manuscript tradition) connect this passage directly to the *Histories*. Moreover, it is significant that F205 (*apud* Plutarch *Lysander* 17.1-2) discusses the introduction of coinage into Sparta during the beginning of her decline from power:

Gylippos, after adding such a shameful and ignoble deed to his previous brilliant and great accomplishments, removed himself from Lacedaimon. The most prudent of the Spartiates, not least on account of Gylippos' actions, fearing the power of money, since it was laying hold of prominent citizens, both reproached Lysander and earnestly entreated the ephors to purge Sparta of all silver and gold as if they were imported curses. The ephors deliberated on the matter. And Theopompos says it was Skiraphidas, Ephoros that it was Phlogidas, who declared that they ought not to admit gold or silver coins into the polis, but use the traditional currency. This was made of iron... (trans. P. Christesen)

Ephoros' overriding interest in successive hegemonies should be viewed in light of the events of the fourth century. Ephoros lived during a period marked by comparatively rapid shifts of hegemonic power. The fifth century witnessed the growing dominance of a handful of particularly powerful *poleis*, most notably Athens and Sparta, which functioned as hegemons within their respective military alliances. After almost an entire century during which Athenian

naval power granted her hegemony by sea to an extent previously unknown in the Greek world, the Spartans emerged after Aegospotami in 405 as the dominant power at sea. Simultaneously, despite the pressures and losses of the Peloponnesian War, her highly professional army victoriously led Peloponnesian forces in Asia Minor and Greece. Sparta had achieved a level of dominance beyond that of even Periclean Athens. This situation was short-lived. With Persian help, Athens regained control of the seas at the Battle of Cnidus in 394 and eventually reformed her naval alliance. While Sparta managed to maintain its supremacy on land for a longer period, Epameinondas of Thebes crushed a Spartan force at Leuctra in 371, establishing Thebes as the dominant power in Greece. This hegemony, too, was short-lived. After the death of Epameinondas, Theban power declined and was ultimately eliminated by Philip of Macedon at Chaeronea in 338. For the first time, the mainland Greeks had completely and collectively lost their independence. Ephoros, who was born c. 400, lived through much of this process. It is not surprising, then, that the rise and fall of hegemonies figure prominently in his main work.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ For the history of the fourth century to Chaeronea, see Ellis 1982-2005a; Ellis 1982-2005b; Lewis 1982-2005, 24-44; Roy 1982-2005, 187-208; Seager 1982-2005a; Seager 1982-2005b; and Pomeroy, *et al.* 1999, 330-394.

Lycurgus

Ephoros viewed certain key individuals as possessing the requisite knowledge and capabilities to influence decisively the course of history. As we have seen, Ephoros was of the opinion that a healthy *politeia* is a necessary precondition for hegemony, and he believed Sparta was a hegemon in Greece for the majority of the years covered in the *Histories*. Ephoros portrayed Lycurgus as the sole creator of the Spartan *politeia*.⁴⁷ Therefore we should expect the lawgiver responsible for the Spartan *politeia*, and thus Spartan hegemony, to be of singular importance within the work. A study of the fragments confirms this assumption. We will see that earlier authors, especially historical writers such as Herodotus and Thucydides, believed that Sparta had experienced significant changes to its governance early in its history, but they did not attribute Sparta's dominant position within the Greek world to the actions of Lycurgus or any

⁴⁷ The historicity of Lycurgus and what, if any, role he actually played in creating the Spartan *politeia* is a subject of much debate. As we will see, ancient authors each had their own particular views on Lycurgus, and an extensive body of modern scholarship has been produced on the subject. Modern arguments on the identity of Lycurgus have varied widely. Among authors who doubt the existence of a reformer named Lycurgus, he has been treated as a cultic figure, a hero, a legend created in the fourth century by Ephoros, and a completely fictional individual to whom the work of an actual lawgiver was credited. Authors who believe he actually lived have argued that Lycurgus was an historical individual who was responsible for creating the entirety of the Spartan social system, a legal reformer who created a significant portion but not the entirety of the Spartan *politeia*, an individual whom later Spartans used to explain social conditions unrelated to his reforms, or a real individual to whom the works of an actual lawgiver were credited. In addition, the dates given for his life vary widely. They range from as early as the eleventh century to as late as the sixth. For scholarship on the historicity and literary representations of Lycurgus and what, if any, constitutional reforms he implemented, see Hammond 1950; Tigerstedt 1965-78, 1: 51-78; Oliva 1967; Toynbee 1969, 221-239, 274-83, and 329-337; Oliva 1971, 63-70; Oliva 1984; Paradiso 2000; and works cited therein. The situation is further complicated by the fact that scholars are currently attempting to determine what, if any, of the ancient traditions regarding the development and structure of the Spartan *politeia* are actually true. As Cartledge has stated, our impression of Sparta is based on "the partly distorted, partly invented image created by and for non-Spartans (with not a little help from their Spartan friends) of what Sparta ideally represented" (Cartledge 1987, 118). For differing views on the historical Spartan *politeia*, see Ollier 1933; Tigerstedt 1965-78, 2: 13-16 and *passim*; Finley 1968; Hodkinson 1994; Flower 2002; Christesen 2004; Hodkinson 2005; and works cited therein.

single individual possessing significant historical agency. While Xenophon portrays Lycurgus as responsible for Spartan hegemony, he does not do so in his main works or his histories; he only does so in the *Lakedaimonion Politeia*, and favors traditional explanations in the *Hellenica*. It is, however, clear that Ephoros had read the *Lakedaimonion Politeia* and was influenced by Xenophon's work. Plato and Isocrates portrayed healthy and well-designed *politeiai* as essential to a strong state and held the Spartan *politeia* up as an ideal, yet did not treat the lawgiver responsible for the Spartan *politeia* as an individual who exerted notable influence upon the course of history. Ephoros, however, accorded Lycurgus a significant degree of historical agency and provided many biographical details in his portrait of the lawgiver, suggesting that Ephoros believed him to be an individual who reshaped his world in a significant manner.

This chapter first examines the extant literary representations of Lycurgus that existed prior to the *Histories*. For each work, I examine the extent to which the author believed Lycurgus influenced the course of Spartan history. The chapter ends with a discussion of all the fragments of Ephoros that treat Lycurgus.

Herodotus' discussion of Lycurgus, which is the oldest preserved account of his actions,⁴⁸ is part of a digression explaining why Croesus sought out Spartan assistance for his campaign against Cyrus. It occurs at 1.65-66:

(1.65) Such, then, was the condition of Athens as Croesus heard of it; but of the Lacedaemonians something else: that they had escaped out of great troubles and that, at this moment, they had proved themselves masters of the people of Tegea in a war. For when Leon and Hegesicles were kings at Sparta, the Lacedaemonians, for all that they were successful in other wars, whenever they encountered the people of Tegea would always fail. Moreover, before this the Spartans had been, in respect of the laws, the very worst [*kakonomotatoi*] of all the Greeks, one might say, and in their dealings with others, and also among themselves, the least free in communication. But then they changed over toward good laws [*eunomia*], and this is how it happened. There was one Lycurgus, a Spartiate and a notable man, who went to Delphi to the oracle; and as soon as he entered the temple hall, the

⁴⁸ Oliva 1984, 534 and Paradiso 2000, 376.

Pythia immediately spoke as follows:

Is it you, Lycurgus, that comes to my rich temple? Lycurgus
Dear to Zeus and to all that hold the halls of Olympus?
I ask myself whether, in prophecy, as a god or a man I shall hail you.
Nay, but 'tis rather a god that I see in you, Lycurgus.

There are some, too, who declare that, in addition, the Pythia dictated to him the present constitution of Sparta [*kosmon Spartieteisi*]; but what the Lacedaemonians themselves say is that Lycurgus brought this constitution from Crete when his nephew, Leobotes, was king at Sparta and Lycurgus became his guardian. For as soon as he took over the guardianship, he changed all the laws [*nomima*] and took care that the new rules should not be transgressed. And afterwards it was Lycurgus who made all the institutions about war [*ta es polemon echonta*], the sworn companies, the regiments of thirty, the communal meals, and, besides these, the ephors and the council of elders.

(1.66) So they changed, and toward good laws [*eunomethesa*], and when Lycurgus died, they erected a statue to him and now do him a great reverence. And inasmuch as theirs was a good country and a populous, they soon grew and flourished... (trans. David Grene).

Herodotus then bypasses nearly five centuries of history and describes Sparta's attacks on Tegea.⁴⁹ Spartan attempts to conquer Tegea during the reigns of Leon and Hegesicles meet with failure. Eventually, a Spartiate named Lichas discovers the bones of Orestes in Tegea during the reigns of Ariston and Anaxandridas and brings them to Sparta, at which point Sparta is able to overcome the Tegeans.

Although the sequence of events within this passage is somewhat unclear, it reveals Herodotus' beliefs on the causal factors in the rise of Spartan power. It appears that the events should be ordered as follows: 1) Sparta suffers from *kakonomia*; 2) Lycurgus institutes reforms and creates *eunomia*; 3) Sparta begins to expand by virtue of its population and geography; 4) Sparta is successful in most wars, but not against Tegea; 5) the Pythia tells the Spartans to recover the bones of Orestes; 6) Lichas recovers the bones of Orestes, and Sparta conquers Tegea. What should be abundantly clear is that, for Herodotus, Lycurgus was at best of

⁴⁹ Herodotus dated Lycurgus to roughly the eleventh or tenth century (Paradiso 2000, 382). Leon and Hegesicles were kings of Sparta in the sixth century.

secondary importance to the rise of Spartan power. The actions of Lichas in returning the bones of Orestes to fulfill the Pythia's prophecy take equal place with the constitutional reforms of Lycurgus in establishing Sparta as the dominant force within the Peloponnese. While Herodotus does credit Lycurgus with replacing *kakonomia* with *eunomia* in Sparta, the reforms he enacted are not solely or largely responsible for the emergence of Sparta as a powerful state. This is obvious due to the large time gap present between the reforms of Lycurgus, which Herodotus dated to the eleventh or tenth century, and the conquest of Tegea under Ariston and Anaxandridas in the middle of the sixth century. Herodotus instead attributed Sparta's rise to its population and geography: "And inasmuch as theirs was a good country and a populous, they soon grew and flourished..." (1.66).⁵⁰ We will see that Herodotus' beliefs on *eunomia* played a significant role in later authors' understanding of the rise of Sparta.

Another early appearance of Lycurgus was in the work of Simonides the genealogist, who was a contemporary of Herodotus and a relative of Simonides the lyric poet.⁵¹ A passage in Plutarch reflects Simonides' views on Lycurgus:

For instance, Simonides the poet says that Lycurgus was not the son of Eunomus, but that both Lycurgus and Eunomus were sons of Prytanis; whereas most writers give a different genealogy as follows: Aristodemus begat Procles, Procles begat Sous, Sous begat Eurypon, and he begat Prytanis, from whom sprang Eunomus, and from Eunomus Polydectes by a first wife, and Lycurgus, who was a younger son by a second wife, Dionassa, as Dieutychidas has

⁵⁰ Paradiso argues that Herodotus glossed over the large gap between Lycurgus and Ariston and Anaxandridas and manipulated evidence to support his belief that the *eunomia* created by Lycurgus established Spartan power over the Peloponnese (Paradiso 2000, 381). This is a problematic interpretation. Herodotus does not ever explicitly link the *eunomia* created by Lycurgus with Spartan power over the Peloponnese, and it is possible that Herodotus skipped from Lycurgus to the sixth century because the events of that period were not pertinent to an account of the emergence of Sparta as a powerful state. If we note that Herodotus mentions Sparta's "good land" and recognize the importance he attributed to geography elsewhere in his work, the link between Lycurgus' creation of *eunomia* and the emergence of Spartan power becomes even more tenuous. It is also possible that the actions of Lycurgus and Lichas serve as bookends for centuries of Spartan development towards mastery of the Peloponnese (Jeremy Rutter, pers. comm. 27 April 2009).

⁵¹ On the identity of Simonides the genealogist, see Paradiso 2009.

written, making Lycurgus sixth from Procles, and eleventh from Herakles. (*FrGH* 596 F12 *apud* Plutarch *Lycurgus* 1.8, trans. B. Perrin).

While Plutarch attributed these beliefs to Simonides the poet, and Jacoby did not include the fragment with others he attributed to Simonides the genealogist, a number of modern scholars have argued instead that they reflect the views of Simonides the genealogist, and the content of the fragment lends strength to this reading.⁵² Simonides altered the established genealogical tradition regarding Lycurgus, which held that he was the second son of Eunomos and his second wife Dionassa, instead suggesting he was the son of Prytanis and brother to Eunomos. Both of these traditions connected Lycurgus to the Eurypontid line of kings.⁵³ Simonides does not appear to have assigned Lycurgus a notable role in determining the course of Spartan history, though this could in part be explained by the fact that his work was a genealogy rather than a history.

Thucydides accorded very little importance to Lycurgus; he does not mention the lawgiver a single time. His discussion of the Spartan *politeia* is but a single paragraph in the introduction to his work:

But at last a time came when the tyrants of Athens and the far older tyrannies of the rest of Hellas were, with the exception of those in Sicily, once and for all put down by Lacedaemon; for this city, though after the settlement of the Dorians, its present inhabitants, it suffered from factions (*stasiasasa*) for an unparalleled length of time, still at a very early period obtained good laws (*eunomeomai*), and enjoyed a freedom from tyrants which was unbroken; it has possessed the same form of government (*politeia*) for more than four hundred years, reckoning to the end of the late war, and has thus been in a position to arrange the affairs of the other states (1.18, trans. J. M. Dent).

⁵² For arguments attributing the fragments to the genealogist, see Meyer 1892, 1: 271 n. 1; Neumann 1910, 117-118; Ehrenberg 1925, 123 n. 8; Kahrstedt 1927, col. 2443; Ollier 1933, 1: 94 n.1; Ziegler 1957, col. 1157; Tigerstedt 1965-78, 1: 376 n. 547 and 2: 239; Paradiso 1999; and Paradiso 2009.

⁵³ Herodotus claimed that Lycurgus was the uncle of Leobotes and thus an Agiad (1.65), which may have been the result of an attempt by the Agiads to strengthen their political position in Sparta. Fourth-century traditions link Lycurgus with the Eurypontid line (Meyer 1892, 1: 275-276).

Thucydides followed Herodotus in describing Sparta as a state that was initially unhealthy and eventually was transformed into a stable and powerful entity. Though he does not explicitly say that the implementation of a new *politeia* was responsible for the shift from *stasis* to *eunomia*, it seems a reasonable conclusion as he says the *politeia* provided both domestic and foreign power and influence. Importantly, Thucydides ignores the tradition of ascribing these reforms to Lycurgus; instead, he focuses on the shift from *stasis* to *eunomia*.⁵⁴

Before discussing Xenophon's portrayal of Lycurgus, it is first necessary to address the problem of dating the works of an author who wrote over such a long span. The dates of composition of all of Xenophon's works are uncertain.⁵⁵ The date of the *Lakedaimonion Politeia* cannot be fixed with a high degree of precision; it is generally accepted that it was written sometime between 394 and 371.⁵⁶ Delebecque suggested that the *Anabasis* and the first two books of the *Hellenica* were written by Xenophon early in his life, while the Socratic writings were produced later in his life; the remainder of the *Hellenica* was produced somewhere in between.⁵⁷

Xenophon provides two different explanations for Sparta's success; Lycurgus figures prominently in only one of them. Xenophon gives Lycurgus a central role in creating and maintaining Spartan power in the *Lakedaimonion Politeia*.⁵⁸ The work opens by describing Xenophon's wonder at Sparta's success, which he portrays as the product of Lycurgus' reforms:

⁵⁴ Paradiso 2000, 382-385.

⁵⁵ Waterfield 2004, 82.

⁵⁶ Humble 2004, 220. See also Ollier 1934, xxiii-xxix; Delebecque 1957, 195-196 and 329-331; Momigliano 1966, 344; Breitenbach 1967, 1752; Anderson 1974, 169; David 1981, 51-52; Moore 1983, 71-72; MacDowell 1986, 13; Meulder 1989, 78-86; Rebenich 1998, 27-29; and Lipka 2002, 10-13.

⁵⁷ Delebecque 1957, 506-509.

⁵⁸ Some modern scholars have questioned whether or not Xenophon was the author of the *Lakedaimonion Politeia* (see Chrimes 1948, 40-48; Carlier 1984, 252; Lana 1992; Whitby 1994,

It occurred to me one day that Sparta, though among the most thinly populated of states, was evidently the most powerful and most celebrated city in Greece; and I fell to wondering how this could have happened. But when I considered the institutions [*epitedeumata*] of the Spartans, I wondered no longer. Lycurgus, who gave them the laws [*nomoi*] that they obey, and to which they owe their prosperity, I do regard with wonder; and I think that he reached the utmost limit of wisdom. For it was not by imitating other states, but by devising a system utterly different from that of most others, that he made his country pre-eminently prosperous (1.1-2, trans. Marchant and Bowerstock).

Xenophon proceeds to describe a number of policies and institutions created by Lycurgus, addressing among other things marriage and childrearing customs, educational practices, and political, military, and social structures and practices.⁵⁹ Xenophon even ascribes particular aspects of the Spartan army's tactics, practices, and logistics to Lycurgus (11.1-10). Near the end of the work, Xenophon declares that the decline of Spartan power occurring in his day was the result of the Spartans' abandonment of Lycurgus' reforms:

Should anyone ask me whether I think that the laws [*nomoi*] of Lycurgus still remain unchanged at this day, I certainly could not say that with any confidence whatever. For I know that formerly the Lacedaemonians preferred to live together at home with moderate fortunes rather than expose themselves to the corrupting influences of flattery as governors of dependent states. And I know too that in former days they were afraid to be found in possession of gold; whereas nowadays there are some who even boast of their possessions. There were alien acts in former days, and to live abroad was illegal; and I have no doubt that the purpose of these regulations was to keep the citizens from being demoralized by contact with foreigners; and now I have no doubt that the fixed ambition of those who are thought to be first among them is to live to their dying day as governors in a foreign land. There was a time when they would fain be worthy of leadership; but now they strive far more earnestly to exercise rule than to be worthy of it. Therefore in times past the Greeks would come to Lacedaemon and beg her to lead them against reputed wrongdoers; but now many are calling

90; Hodkinson 1994, 217 n. 22; and Bianco 1996, 12). However, it is currently the dominant opinion that Xenophon is the author of the work (see Richards 1907, 40-47; Ollier 1933, 377-378; Ollier 1934, vii-viii; Tigerstedt 1965-78, 1: 462-464 n. 530; Breitenbach 1967, 1647; Moore 1983, 67; MacDowell 1986, 8; Kennell 1995, 10-11; Rebenich 1998, 14-15; Lipka 2002, 5-9 and 46-55; Humble 2004, 217; and works cited therein).

⁵⁹ Xenophon only explicitly refers to *politeia* once in the work. This occurs at 15.1: "I wish also to give an account of the compact made by Lycurgus between King and state. For this is the only government that continues exactly as it was originally established, whereas other constitutions [*politeiai*] will be found to have undergone and still to be undergoing modifications" (trans. Marchant and Bowerstock). He instead uses the words *nomoi* and *epitedeumata* to refer to the majority of the institutions and legal reforms enacted by Lycurgus.

on one another to prevent a revival of Lacedaemonian supremacy. Yet we need not wonder if these reproaches are leveled at them, since it is manifest that they obey neither their god nor the laws [*nomoi*] of Lycurgus (14.1-7).⁶⁰

In this particular work, Lycurgus plays a prominent role.⁶¹ As Paradiso has noted, the *Lakedaimonion Politeia* represents the first attempt to use the laws of Lycurgus as the determining factor in explaining Spartan history and success.⁶²

Lycurgus also plays a role in a number of Xenophon's Socratic works. The most important reference to Lycurgus in the Socratic writings occurs in the *Memorabilia*, where Xenophon credits Lycurgus with establishing Sparta as a state significantly different from the rest of Greece:

Lycurgus the Lacedaemonian now — have you realised that he would not have made Sparta to differ from other cities in any respect, had he not established obedience to the laws [*nomoi*] most securely in her? Among rulers in cities, are you not aware that those who do most to make the citizens obey the laws [*nomoi*] are the best, and that the city in which the citizens are most obedient to the laws [*nomoi*] has the best time in peace and is irresistible in war? (4.4.15, trans. E. C. Marchant).

⁶⁰ Some scholars have suggested that this passage was a later addition by a separate author (e.g., Hirsch 1985, 95) or a later addition to the work by Xenophon (e.g., MacDowell 1986, 10-11; Bowersock and Marchant 1925, xxi-xxii; and Lipka 2002, 27-31). The dominant opinion today is that Xenophon wrote the passage at the same time as the rest of the work. See Strauss 1939, 522-525; Higgins 1977, 66; Bordes 1982, 199-200; Carlier 1984, 252-254; Anderson 1986, 36 n. 6; Cartledge 1987, 57; Proietti 1987, 46; and Meulder 1989, 74.

⁶¹ As we will see, Ephoros portrayed Lycurgus as the lawgiver responsible for the Spartan *politeia* and therefore the Spartan hegemony. This striking similarity to Xenophon's portrayal of Lycurgus in the *Lakedaimonion Politeia* strongly suggests that Ephoros closely read the *Lakedaimonion Politeia* and followed Xenophon's theories in his work. Xenophon, however, appears to have criticized Lycurgus' reforms because they failed to eliminate the desire for wealth, instead focusing on preventing the public display of wealth. See Humble 1997, 187-240; Humble 2004, 220-227. This is in contrast to Ephoros, who, as we have seen, held that a healthy *politeia* eliminated *pleonexia* (greed) and believed that the Spartan *politeia* was an example of a healthy *politeia*. As we will see, Ephoros' portrayed Lysander as a foil to Lycurgus. According to Ephoros, it was Lysander's alterations of the Lycurgan *politeia*, not a fundamental flaw within it, that resulted in the loss of Spartan hegemony

⁶² Paradiso 2000, 385-391.

Though Lycurgus is not credited here with establishing Spartan superiority, he does remain a unique figure and responsible for setting Sparta apart from the other Greek states. In the *Apology*, Xenophon recounts that Apollo greeted Lycurgus by asking if he should be addressed as a god or a man (15.3, cf. Herodotus 1.65); he makes no mention of Lycurgus' role in the creation of the Spartan state besides calling him the Lacedaemonian lawgiver.

In Xenophon's historical writings, however, he does not attribute Sparta's rise to Lycurgus. Though Spartan hegemony is a central part of the *Hellenica*, Xenophon gives no special place to Lycurgus, instead attributing Spartan military supremacy to Laconian geography (7.1.8-11) and Spartan decline in the fourth century to Sparta's impropriety, which is characterized as an affront to the gods (5.3.27-41, 6.4.3). As Wickersham has noted:

...there is nothing special about Lycurgus, no indication that any special way of life was responsible for Spartan success, that violating it was what brought them disaster. In the *Hellenica* it is not possible to tell Spartans from other Greeks; in the *Hellenica* Spartan decline, such as it is, is a decline from the common standards of all Greece, not from Sparta's specially exalted character.⁶³

Likewise, in the *Anabasis*, Xenophon makes no mention of Lycurgus. Taken together, the treatment of Lycurgus in Xenophon's historical accounts suggests that in these works Xenophon portrayed Lycurgus in a manner fundamentally different than he did in his more philosophical and theoretical pieces. In his histories, Xenophon used explanatory theories such as geography and divine order that are more in line with earlier writers of history, while his philosophical writings credited Lycurgus with a significant role in shaping Greek history.

Plato clearly believed that a strong state could only emerge from a healthy *politeia*. Plato states the key objectives of his ideal *politeia* in Book 1 of the *Laws*:

“O Stranger” (thus you ought to have said), “it is not for nothing that the laws [*nomoi*] of the Cretans are held in superlatively high repute among all the Hellenes. For they are true laws

⁶³ Wickersham 1994, 82.

inasmuch as they affect the well-being of those who use them by supplying all that are good. Now goods are of two kinds, human and divine; and the human goods are dependent on the divine, and he who receives the greater acquires also the less, or else he is bereft of both. (631c) The lesser goods are those of which health ranks first, beauty second; the third is strength, in running and all other bodily exercises; and the fourth is wealth—no blind god Plutus, but keen of sight, provided that he has wisdom for companion. And wisdom, in turn, has first place among the goods that are divine, and rational temperance of soul comes second; from these two, when united with courage, there issues justice, as the third; (631d) and the fourth is courage. Now all these are by nature ranked before the human goods, and verily the lawgiver [*nomothetes*] also must so rank them. Next, it must be proclaimed to the citizens that all the other instructions they receive have these in view; and that, of these goods themselves, the human look up to the divine, and the divine to reason as their chief. And in regard to their marriage connections, and to their subsequent breeding and rearing of children, male and female, both during youth and in later life (631e) up to old age, the lawgiver must supervise the citizens, duly apportioning honor and dishonor; and in regard to all their forms of intercourse he must observe and watch their pains and pleasures and desires and (632a) all intense passions, and distribute praise and blame correctly by the means of the laws themselves. Moreover, in the matter of anger and of fear, and of all the disturbances which befall souls owing to misfortune, and of all the avoidances thereof which occur in good-fortune, and of all the experiences which confront men through disease or war or penury or their opposites—(632b) in regard to all these definite instruction must be given as to what is the right and what the wrong disposition in each case. It is necessary, in the next place, for the lawgiver [*nomothetes*] to keep a watch on the methods employed by the citizens in gaining and spending money, and to supervise the associations they form with one another, and the dissolutions thereof, whether they be voluntary or under compulsion; he must observe the manner in which they conduct each of these mutual transactions, and note where justice obtains and where it is lacking. To those that are obedient he must assign honors by law [*nomos*], but on the disobedient he must impose (632c) duly appointed penalties. Then finally, when he arrives at the completion of the whole constitution [*politeia*], he has to consider in what manner in each case the burial of the dead should be carried out, and what honors should be assigned to them. This being settled, the framer of the laws [*nomoi*] will hand over all his statutes to the charge of Wardens—guided some by wisdom, others by true opinion—to the end that Reason, having bound all into one single system, may declare them to be ancillary neither to wealth nor ambition, but to temperance and justice.” (632d) In this manner, Strangers, I could have wished (and I wish it still) that you had fully explained how all these regulations are inherent in the reputed laws [*nomoi*] of Zeus and in those of the Pythian Apollo which were ordained by Minos and Lycurgus, and how their systematic arrangement is quite evident to him who, whether by art or practice, is an expert in law, although it is by no means obvious to the rest of us” (631b-632d, trans. R. G. Bury).

For Plato, a healthy state was one in which a lawgiver had enacted the appropriate codes necessary for the cultivation of virtue in its citizenry. A prudent lawgiver would correctly rank the virtues identified by Plato, placing divine virtues above human virtues and ensuring that

citizens lived according to those virtues by rewarding those who lived virtuously with honor and shaming those who did not. The remainder of the work is a further discussion of which laws should be enacted to ensure just behavior of the citizens.

Plato believed that the creation of an ideal *politeia* was a difficult process that could most readily be implemented through the actions of certain powerful individuals. This is seen in Book 4 of the *Laws*:

So likewise of power in general, the same rule holds good: whenever the greatest power coincides in a man with wisdom and temperance, then the germ of the best polity is planted; but in no other way will it ever come about. Regard this as a myth oracularly uttered, and let us take it as proved that the rise of a well-governed State [*eunomos*] is in one way difficult, but in another way—given, that is, the condition we mention—it is easier by far and quicker than anything else (711e-12a).

While the passage does not specifically address the emergence of the Spartan *politeia*, it does show that Plato believed that the combination of power, wisdom, and temperance in a single individual increased the likelihood that his state would emerge as healthy.

Despite his emphasis on the role of individuals in creating *politeiai*, Plato does not attribute the entirety of the reforms at Sparta to Lycurgus and instead demonstrates a lack of concern as to who created the *politeia* at Sparta. Plato's ambivalence on Lycurgus' role should be considered significant. In the *Laws* at 684b he expresses uncertainty about the origin of initial codes in the three early Peloponnesian states (Argos, Messenia, and Sparta) by refusing to decide upon the authors of the codes: "whether the kings legislated [them] or some others" (translation my own). The same uncertainty concerning the initial lawgivers is seen at 692b: "whomever those lawgivers were" (translation my own). A later reform created the Gerousia at Sparta, and a third established the ephorate (692a). Lycurgus is not mentioned by name in this section.

Morrow has argued that Plato is referring to Lycurgus at 691e when he describes the author of the Gerousia as a man imbued with divine power. It appears that Plato, despite following the

tradition of referring to Lycurgus as the Spartan lawgiver, viewed Lycurgus as a man who further developed an already extant *politeia* that continued to evolve after his death.⁶⁴

Isocrates addresses the purpose and nature of *politeiai* in a number of his works. In several of these (e.g., *Archidamos*, *On the Peace*, *Areopagiticus*, *Busiris*, *Letter 9*, *Nicocles* and *Panathenaikos*), Isocrates connects hegemony to *politeiai*.⁶⁵ This is most clearly seen in *On the Peace* at 95-96:

For this power [imperialism] revealed its nature much more quickly in their [the Spartans'] case. Indeed it brought it to pass that a polity [*politeia*] which over seven hundred years had never, so far as we know, been disturbed by perils or calamities was shaken and all but destroyed in a short space of time. For in place of the ways of life established among them it filled the citizens with injustice, indolence, lawlessness and avarice and the commonwealth [κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως] with contempt for its allies, covetousness of the possessions of other states, and indifference to its oaths and covenants (trans. G. Norlin).

Isocrates then describes Spartan history up to its downfall at the hands of Thebes, and states:

For they [the Spartans] no longer kept the laws [*nomoi*] which they had inherited from their ancestors nor remained faithful to the ways [*ethos*] which they had followed in times past, but conceived that they were licensed to do whatever they pleased and so were plunged into great confusion... For when these states [Sparta and Athens], which in time past had governed themselves with the utmost sobriety and enjoyed the highest esteem, attained to this license and seized the empire [*arche*], they differed in no respect from each other, but, as is natural in the case of those who have been depraved by the same passions and the same malady, they attempted the same deeds and indulged in similar crimes and, finally, fell into the same disasters (102-104).

⁶⁴ Morrow 1960, 68.

⁶⁵ Cloché 1933; Oliva 1984, 537-539; and Cataldi 1996, 64. It might seem that Ephoros' beliefs concerning the role of the *politeia* in establishing hegemony strongly link him to Isocrates and provide support for the argument that he is the pupil of the orator. This is an oversimplified conclusion. It is important to note the nature of Isocrates' views on *politeia*. At various points in his works, he praises the Spartan *politeia* for different reasons, some of which are at times in conflict (e.g., calling the Spartan state a democracy in *Areopagiticus*, but a mixture of oligarchy and monarchy in *Nicocles*). He does not develop a consistent opinion as to what makes a good *politeia*, and instead praises *politeia* for different reasons in his speeches. Ephoros, in contrast, developed a uniform definition of a good *politeia* that he applied throughout his work. The similarities between the two authors' works can be explained by Ephoros' certain familiarity with the writings of Isocrates. That Isocrates influenced Ephoros does not in and of itself support the conclusion that Ephoros was his pupil.

Isocrates clearly believed that *politeiai* functioned as a force that restrained arrogance in the conduct of powerful states. As a result, they did not overextend themselves or alienate their allies, resulting in the creation of a state capable of achieving hegemony.

However, Isocrates' emphasis on the *politeia* does not result in an emphasis on the *nomothetes*. Indeed, he treats the *politeiai* themselves as more important than the *nomothetai* who created them and spends significantly more time addressing the aspects of the *politeia* than the *nomothetai*. Lycurgus is explicitly mentioned in only one of Isocrates' works, the *Panathenaikos*. At 153-154, he claims that Lycurgus created an imitation of the Athenian *politeia* and was not the originator of the Spartan *politeia*:

I acknowledge that I am going to speak at length of the institutions of Sparta, not taking the view, however, that Lycurgus invented or conceived any of them, but that he imitated as well as he could the government (*dioikesis*) of our ancestors, establishing among the Spartans a democracy tempered with aristocracy—even such as existed in Athens—, enacting that the offices be filled, not by lot but by election, ordaining that the election of the Elders, who were to supervise all public affairs, should be conducted with the very same care as, they say, our ancestors also exercised with regard to those who were to have seats in the Areopagus, and, furthermore, conferring upon the Elders the very same power which he knew that the Council of the Areopagus also had in Athens (trans. G. Norlin).

Isocrates then describes a number of Spartan institutions that he claims were drawn from Athens. Here Lycurgus is portrayed solely as an imitator, and not a particularly inspired one at that, as the institutions are portrayed as direct copies of Athenian models. It does not appear that Isocrates believed that Lycurgus possessed a significant degree of historical agency. He is, however, the sole author of the Spartan *politeia*.⁶⁶

Up to this point in Greek literature, Lycurgus has occurred frequently in descriptions of early Sparta. However, with the exception of Xenophon, no author has given him responsibility

⁶⁶ Cloché 1933, 142-143.

for the establishment of Spartan hegemony. While he was often portrayed as an important individual, he was typically not viewed as a man who fundamentally shaped the Greek world.

In contrast to the moderate degree of importance that most of the earlier authors gave Lycurgus, the fragments from the *Histories* show that Ephoros attributed the central role in the creation of Spartan hegemony to Lycurgus. The remainder of this chapter examines the fragments that provide information relevant to Ephoros' conception of the historical agency of Lycurgus. The most important of these fragments is F118 (*apud* Strabo 8.5.5):

Now the new possessors of Laconia restrained themselves at first, but after they turned over the *politeia* to Lycurgus they so far surpassed the rest that they alone of the Greeks ruled over both land and sea, and they continued ruling the Greeks until they were deprived of their hegemony, first by the Thebans, and immediately after them by the Macedonians.... Now Hellanicus says that Eurysthenes and Procles drew up the constitution; but Ephorus censures Hellanicus, saying that he has nowhere mentioned Lycurgus and that he ascribes the work of Lycurgus to persons who had nothing to do with it. At any rate, Ephorus continues, it is to Lycurgus alone that a temple has been erected and that annual sacrifices are offered... (trans. H. L. Jones).

Ephoros' causal theories revolve around the idea that freedom and hegemony are the products of a well-designed *politeia*, and F118 shows that Ephoros explicitly linked the emergence of Spartan hegemony to the *politeia* established by Lycurgus. Because the Spartan *politeia* and therefore Sparta's hegemony resulted directly from the actions of Lycurgus, it is clear that Ephoros believed Lycurgus possessed a significant degree of historical agency.

In F118, Ephoros also rebukes an earlier author for his statements regarding the origins of the Spartan *politeia*. Strabo tells us that Ephoros took issue with the representation of early Spartan history as presented by Hellanicus, a prominent logographer in the fifth century. It is important to note that the disagreement between the two authors is not the result of differences concerning the contents of the *politeia*, as might be expected given the centrality of *politeiai* in Ephoros and the extensive details he provides about the role and nature of *politeiai*. Ephoros'

criticism of Hellanicus is instead based on their differing accounts of the authorship of the Spartan *politeia*. Whereas Hellanicus believed Eurysthenes and Procles, the first two kings of Sparta according to tradition, established the Spartan *politeia*, Ephoros insisted upon crediting the *politeia* to Lycurgus.

F148 (*apud* Polybius 6.45-6) is the next fragment of the *Histories* that sheds lights on Ephoros' views on Lycurgus. In this passage, Polybius argues against the prevailing tradition of his time that Crete and Sparta were governed according to similar *politeiai*.

(6.45.1) Passing to the *politeia* of the Cretans, there are two points that merit attention: How do the most learned of the ancient writers, Ephorus, Xenophon, Callisthenes, Plato, say in the first place that it is similar to that of the Lacedaimonians and in the second place (2) portray it as worthy of praise? It seems to me (3) that neither of these assertions is true. It is possible to see that this is so from the following considerations. First we will go through in detail the dissimilarity of the two *politeiai*. They say [*phasi*] that the defining traits of the *politeia* of the Lacedaimonians are, first, those concerning landed property, by which no one possesses more than another, but all the citizens must possess (4) an equal share of the *politike chora*; second, those concerning the acquisition of wealth, which is completely discredited among them, as a result of which competition about who has more and who less is entirely removed from the *politeia*. Third, among the Lacedaimonians the kings hold a permanent office, those known as *gerontes* are chosen for life; by these and with these all affairs (6.46.1) pertaining to the *politeia* are conducted. Among the Cretans the exact reverse of all these arrangements obtains. For the laws allow them to possess as much land as they can get with no limitation whatsoever, (2) as the saying goes, and money is so highly valued among them that its possession is not only thought to be necessary, but also a most beautiful thing. (3) And in fact their customs pertaining to *aischrokerdeia* [base desire for gain] and *pleonexia* are such that only among the Cretans of all peoples (4) is no stigma attached to any sort of gain. And among them all their offices are annual and the selection of office holders is conducted (5) in a democratic fashion. I have therefore often felt at a loss how they report about things that are opposite by nature as if they were cognate and related to each other. (6) And apart from overlooking these large differences, they in the bargain discuss these matters at considerable length, asserting that Lycurgus was the only man (7) who grasped the matters of importance in regard to keeping a state together. For there being two things by means of which the entire *politeuma* is safeguarded, *andreia* in the face of the enemy and *homonoia* among the citizens, Lycurgus removed *pleonexia* and at the same time removed along with it all civic discord and *stasis*. (8) They also say that the Lacedaimonians, being free from these evils, are the best of the Greeks in their conduct of their internal affairs (9) and in their spirit of union. But while asserting these things, and though they see that in contrast the Cretans because of their ingrained *pleonexia* are roiled by countless public and private seditions and murders and civil wars, they think that these things are irrelevant and dare to say that (10) the two *politeumata* are similar. Ephorus, apart from the names, makes use of the same terminology in explaining

each of these *politeiai* so that, unless one paid attention to the proper names, it would in no way be possible to tell which of the two he was describing (trans. P. Christesen).

The first block of information concerning Sparta (45.1-4) is of little utility in determining Ephoros' views on Lycurgus and his reforms at Sparta.⁶⁷ The second (46.6-9), however, can be used with some degree of certainty to reconstruct Ephoros' understanding of Sparta and Lycurgus.⁶⁸ It is apparent that Ephoros viewed Lycurgus as an individual possessing a unique degree of understanding (46.6). Lycurgus was able to recognize the challenges facing Sparta and created solutions to those problems (46.7). Freed from these burdens, the Spartans were able to establish themselves as the most healthy and best-functioning state within Greece (46.8-9). If we recall that healthy, free states in Ephoros' account of history achieve hegemony, then it should become apparent that F148 also suggests that Lycurgus was singularly responsible for the creation of the Spartan hegemony.

Ephoros also provided abundant biographical details about Lycurgus. He attempted to rationalize myths concerning Lycurgus and provided a wide range of details of Lycurgus' life, including travels, associations, birth, injuries, legislation, family and family history. The best example of Ephoros' rationalizing myths occurs in Theon's *Progymnastika*:

The same method is also followed by Ephoros in his fourth book. Tityos was the unjust and violent ruler of Panopea. The brutal nature of Python was responsible for his nickname "the serpent." The inhabitants of the region formerly called Phlegra, now called Pallene, were cruel and sacrilegious and cannibalistic, and were called giants. It is said that Heracles subdued them after conquering Troy, and because Heracles and those who assisted him, who were few in number, subdued the giants who were numerous and impious, the battle was

⁶⁷ Earlier readings of this passage interpreted the list of four authors at 45.1 as the subject of $\phi\alpha\sigma\iota$ in 45.3. See Wachsmuth 1870; Meyer 1892, 1: 215-22; Walbank 1957-1979, 1: 726-732. This has fallen out of favor, and now $\phi\alpha\sigma\iota$ is generally taken to be indefinite, referring to prevailing views on Sparta that existed when Polybius wrote his work. See Ducat 1983, 152-6 and Hodkinson 2000, 29-30. A summary of both of these views (and an endorsement of the latter) can be found in Christesen, "Spartans and Scythians."

⁶⁸ The passage uses language strongly reminiscent of Ephoros, and Polybius cites Ephoros in the passage that follows immediately after this one. See Christesen, "Spartans and Scythians."

considered by all to be the work of the gods. And he [Ephoros] explained all the other legends of the same sort about Lycurgus, Minos, Rhadamanthys, Zeus, and the Curetes as well as the rest of the myths set in Crete (F31a, 32, 34 *apud* Theon *Progymnastika* 95.23-96.4, trans. P. Christesen).⁶⁹

Unfortunately, Theon does not preserve any of the myths concerning Lycurgus which Ephoros retold, and the fragment is of limited utility.

The largest block of information concerning the life of Lycurgus is found in F149 (*apud* Strabo 10.4.18-19). Strabo is discussing Ephoros' portrayal of the Cretan and Spartan *politeiai*:

[18] Lycurgus the Spartan law-giver, Ephorus continues, was five generations later than the Althaemenes who conducted the colony to Crete; for historians say that Althaemenes was son of the Cissus who founded Argos about the same time when Procles was establishing Sparta as metropolis; and Lycurgus, as is agreed by all, was sixth in descent from Procles; and copies are not earlier than their models, nor more recent things earlier than older things; not only the dancing which is customary among the Lacedaemonians, but also the rhythms and paeans that are sung according to law, and many other Spartan institutions, are called "Cretan" among the Lacedaemonians, as though they originated in Crete; and some of the public offices are not only administered in the same way as in Crete, but also have the same names, as, for instance, the office of the "Gerontes," and that of the "Hippeis" (except that the "Hippeis" in Crete actually possessed horses, and from this fact it is inferred that the office of the "Hippeis" in Crete is older, for they preserve the true meaning of the appellation, whereas the Lacedaemonian "Hippeis" do not keep horses); but though the Ephors have the same functions as the Cretan Cosmi, they have been named differently; and the public messes are, even today, still called "Andreia" among the Cretans, but among the Spartans they ceased to be called by the same name as in earlier times; at any rate, the following is found in Alcman:

In feasts and festive gatherings, amongst the guests who partake of the Andreia, 'tis meet to begin the paeon.

(19) It is said by the Cretans, Ephorus continues, that Lycurgus came to them for the following reason: Polydectes was the elder brother of Lycurgus; when he died he left his wife pregnant; now for a time Lycurgus reigned in his brother's place, but when a child was born he became the child's guardian, since the office of king descended to the child, but some man, railing at Lycurgus, said that he knew for sure that Lycurgus would be king; and Lycurgus, suspecting that in consequence of such talk he himself might be falsely accused of plotting against the child, and fearing that, if by any chance the child should die, he himself might be blamed for it by his enemies, sailed away to Crete; this, then, is said to be the cause of his sojourn in Crete; and when he arrived he associated with Thales, a melic poet and an expert in lawgiving; and after learning from him the manner in which both Rhadamanthys in

⁶⁹ The fragments come from the same section of the *Progymnastika*, where Theon discusses the tendency of Greek authors to rationalize myth.

earlier times and Minos in later times published their laws to men as from Zeus, and after sojourning in Egypt also and learning among other things their institutions, and, according to some writers, after meeting Homer, who was living in Chios, he sailed back to his homeland, and found his brother's son, Charilaüs the son of Polydectes, reigning as king; and then he set out to frame the laws, making visits to the god at Delphi, and bringing thence the god's decrees, just as Minos and his house had brought their ordinances from the cave of Zeus, most of his being similar to theirs (trans. H. L. Jones).

Strabo preserves a number of details concerning Ephoros' portrayal of Lycurgus. Ephoros dated Lycurgus six generations from Procles and the founding of Sparta (which has led Parmeggiani to date Ephoros' Lycurgus around 900).⁷⁰ He was the younger brother of the Spartan king and served for a time as his nephew's regent before leaving Sparta to avoid any blame should the child die before reaching adulthood. These travels led him to Crete, where he studied the laws of Rhadamanthys and Minos and brought them back to Sparta. Through consultation with the Delphic Oracle, he was able to implement a successful *politeia*.

Importantly, the driving force in the creation of the *politeia* is Lycurgus himself. He decides to leave Sparta and visit Crete to protect his name, he studies the laws of Minos and Rhadamanthys, and he plans to implement legal changes in Sparta. The passage portrays Lycurgus as an individual possessing significant historical agency. External causal forces are entirely absent, and here Ephoros portrays the visits to the Delphic oracle as a method for Lycurgus to legitimize his *politeia* rather than as the ultimate source of those laws.

Three short fragments supply additional information concerning Lycurgus. F173 (*apud* Schol. Pindar *Pythian Odes* 1.120b) tells us that Ephoros placed Lycurgus in the eleventh generation after Heracles, providing further chronological details for the lawgiver.⁷¹ F174 (*apud* Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 1.170.3) links Ephoros' portrayal of Minos and Lycurgus with

⁷⁰ Parmeggiani 2003, 203-205.

⁷¹ F173: "Some thus the measures of Hyllos. Of the nomothesia of Lycurgus. For he was 11th from Heracles, as Ephorus relates" (trans. P. Christesen).

those of Plato and Aristotle:

Plato, Aristotle, and Ephorus record that Minos received his laws from Zeus every ninth year, going to Zeus' cave; and that Lycurgus was educated in legislation on his frequent visits to Apollo at Delphi (trans. B. D. Ehrman).

Interestingly, Clement suggests that Ephoros claimed that Minos "received his laws from Zeus," whereas Lycurgus was "educated in legislation." Again, Lycurgus is personally responsible for the laws, as Apollo provides the education for the creation of a *politeia* rather than the actual *politeia* itself. Finally, F175 (*apud* Aelian *Varia Historia* 13.23) tells us that Ephoros believed Lycurgus died of hunger in exile from Sparta.⁷²

From the amount of information the fragments preserve, it is clear that Ephoros considered the aspects of Lycurgus' life to be extremely significant. Indeed, there are sufficient details for Tigerstedt to suggest that Ephoros produced the first biography of Lycurgus.⁷³ While biographical details are not unknown in earlier historical writings, they are predominantly supplemental information and do not have the place of prominence that they do in Ephoros, further suggesting the centrality of influential individuals in general and Lycurgus in particular within Ephoros' work.

By the time Ephoros wrote the *Histories*, an abundant literary tradition on Sparta, Lycurgus, and *politeiai* was already in existence. Ephoros relied extensively upon this tradition, yet exhibited significant originality in his theories. He granted a greater degree of historical agency to Lycurgus than any previous historian, and in all of earlier Greek literature, only Xenophon's *Lakedaimonion Politeia* used Lycurgus and his reforms to explain Spartan history.

⁷² F175: "Lycurgus of Sparta, son of Eunomus, wanted to instil justice into the Spartans, but did not receive a good reward for this. He suffered the loss of an eye at the hands of Alcander; some say a stone was deliberately thrown at him, but another widely current account is that he suffered a blow from a stick. But Ephorus says that after a long struggle against hunger he died in exile" (trans. N. G. Wilson).

⁷³ Tigerstedt 1965-78, 1: 210.

Lysander

If Ephoros placed such emphasis on the actions of a specific individual in establishing Spartan hegemony, we must ask what role he gave an individual in precipitating its downfall. Unfortunately, the sections of the *Histories* that address the decline of Spartan hegemony are not preserved. However, the fragments that describe the period after the end of the Peloponnesian War strongly suggest that Ephoros believed Lysander was instrumental in the collapse of Spartan power and thus the opposite of Lycurgus.

Ephoros discusses Lysander in three of his fragments, each of which depicts Lysander as attempting to alter the Spartan way of life. In the key fragment (F207 *apud* Plutarch *Lysander* 30.3-5), Ephoros claims that Lysander sought to refashion key elements of the Lycurgan *politeia*:

But after some time had passed, according to Ephorus, some dispute arose at Sparta with her allies, and it became necessary to inspect the writings which Lysander had kept by him; for which purpose Agesilaus went to his house. And when he found the book containing the speech on the constitution [*politeia*], which argued that the kingship ought to be taken from the Eurypontidae and Agiadae and made accessible to all Spartans alike, and that the choice should be made from the best of these, he was eager to produce the speech before his countrymen, and show them what the real character of Lysander's citizenship had been. But Lacratidas, a prudent man, and at that time the principal ephor, held Agesilaus back, saying that they ought not to dig Lysander up again, but rather to bury the speech along with him, since it was composed with such a subtle persuasiveness (trans B. Perrin).

From other sources (e.g., Xenophon, *Hellenica* 2.4.29, 3.4.2, and 3.4.7-8 and Diodorus Siculus 14.13.1-8), we know that Lysander was involved in a power struggle after the end of the Peloponnesian War, one in which he was not able to gain an advantage over the kings and ephors.⁷⁴ In Ephoros' accounts of relevant events, he portrays Lysander as an overly ambitious man who was willing to sacrifice the Spartan *politeia* for his own advancement.

⁷⁴ See Oliva 1971, 179-188.

Ephoros also depicts Lysander's disregard for the underlying tenets of Lycurgus' *politeia* by recounting his attempts to bribe the oracles at Delphi and Ammon. This occurs at F206 (*apud* Plutarch *Lysander* 25.2-4):

Well, then, Ephoros tells us that after an attempt to corrupt the Pythian priestess, and after a second failure to persuade the priestesses of Dodona by means of Pherecles, he went up to the temple of Ammon and had a conference with that god's interpreters there, at which he offered them much money, but that they took this ill, and sent certain messengers to Sparta to denounce him; and further, that when Lysander was acquitted of their charges, the Libyans said, as they went away, "But we will pass better judgments than yours, O Spartans, when ye come to dwell with us in Libya;" for they knew that there was a certain ancient oracle bidding the Lacedaemonians to settle in Libya. But since the whole plot and concoction was no insignificant one, nor yet carelessly undertaken, but made many important assumptions, like a mathematical demonstration, and proceeded to its conclusion through premises which were difficult and hard to obtain, we shall follow, in our description of it, the account of one who was both a historian and a philosopher.⁷⁵

Ephoros is the only likely candidate for the historian and philosopher referenced at the end, due both to the proximity of his name to the phrase and the fact that he is the only source explicitly cited in the section. The fragment occurs in the midst of Plutarch's discussion of Lysander's attempts to "take the government [*arche*] away from the two houses" (24.4). It is not possible to determine exactly how much of Plutarch's description of the specific details of the plot draws directly from Ephoros, but this is not necessary for the reconstruction of his views on Lysander.

⁷⁵ Flower has argued that Ephoros' claims here and in F207 are "patently absurd" and were invented after Lysander's death to discredit him (Flower 1991, 81-83 and Flower 1994, 188). See also Prentice 1934, 39-40 and Smith 1948, 148-149. Prentice claims that Ephoros was likely the inventor of this story, while Flower rejects that theory as unlikely because Aristotle was also familiar with the tradition. While it would strengthen the argument that Ephoros viewed Lysander as the source of Sparta's downfall if he invented this tradition, it cannot be attributed to him with a high degree of certainty. Nevertheless, a number of scholars treat Lysander's plot as historical. See Oliva 1971, 185-186; Hamilton 1979, 88-89, 92-96; Bommelaer 1981, 223-225; David 1981, 13-17; Cartledge 1987, 94-97.

In general, Ephoros claimed that Lysander sought to purchase oracles to justify constitutional reforms that would place him on the throne of Sparta.⁷⁶

Moreover, Ephoros suggests that Lysander sought to bring money into Sparta. This is seen at F205 (*apud* Plutarch *Lysander* 17.1-2). Here, Ephoros describes a debate that resulted from Gylippos' theft of the money seized by Lysander after the *nauarch* ordered him to take it back to Sparta:

Gylippus, then, after adding a deed so disgraceful and ignoble as this to his previous great and brilliant achievements, removed himself from Lacedaemon. And the wisest of the Spartans, being led by this instance in particular to fear the power of money, which they said was corrupting influential as well as ordinary citizens, reproached Lysander, and fervently besought the ephors to purify the city of all the silver and the gold, as imported curses. The ephors deliberated on the matter. And it was Sciraphidas, according to Theopompus, or Phlogidas, according to Ephorus, who declared that they ought not to receive gold and silver coinage into the city, but to use that of the country. Now this was of iron...

Because Lysander had both gained the wealth and sent it back to Sparta, he is clearly intimately involved in its reintroduction to Sparta.

These fragments suggest that Ephoros presented Lysander as a foil to Lycurgus.⁷⁷ This is most obvious in the differences in their attitudes towards money. Ephoros believed that Lycurgus recognized that wealth was an enervating force and must be prohibited in order to ensure that *homonoia* and *andreia* would be inculcated in the citizenry. In contrast, Lysander gained wealth

⁷⁶ We should note the tradition, preserved in Herodotus at 1.65, that the Delphic oracle spontaneously greeted Lycurgus as a god. Though the fragments do not discuss this event, they suggest that Ephoros was aware of the tradition; it seems likely that he included it in his narrative and that section is simply not preserved.

⁷⁷ Drawing from Plutarch's *Lysander* 17.1-6, some have already noted the contrast between Lycurgus' and Lysander's policies towards money. See Figueira 2002, 141-147 and Flower 2002, 193. In contrast, Hodkinson has argued that Ephoros did not claim that the ban on money came from Lycurgus because Plutarch does not mention Lycurgus in the sentences that specifically cite Ephoros (Hodkinson 2000, 166). Flower rightly argues that the lack of a citation does not preclude Ephoros from being Plutarch's source for the Lycurgan tradition and that two passages in Diodorus that lack attribution (7.12.5 and 7.12.8, see pp. 19 and 21 of this thesis) strongly suggest that Ephoros did in fact record a Lycurgan ban on coinage (Flower 2002, 210 n. 7).

while waging war against Athens and then sent it back to Sparta. Ephoros shows the immediate effect of this action, as Gylippos, an otherwise admirable and brave Spartan general, is corrupted simply by bringing the money from Athens to Sparta. We should also note that Ephoros claimed that Lysander sought to bribe the oracles of Delphi and Ammon, further indicating the corrosive influence of wealth in the *Histories*. Lysander thus ignored and disobeyed a key prohibition of Lycurgus' *politeia*. Furthermore, he attempted to alter the nature of the *politeia* itself by changing the process for the selection of the kings. Finally, Ephoros links Lycurgus and Lysander in that both sought to validate their reforms by consulting the oracles.⁷⁸ Lysander's failure here parallels the failure of his attempts to implement a new *politeia*.

Ephoros' beliefs on wealth and *politeiai* provide the only logical framework in which Lysander can be blamed for bringing about the Spartan collapse. Lysander died at Haliartus in 395, a full two decades before Sparta's defeat at Leuctra that marked the end of its hegemony. He therefore cannot be directly blamed for Spartan misbehavior or poor battlefield outcomes in the intervening period. He can only be at fault if he introduced changes that fundamentally altered the nature of the Spartan state.

In contrast to the *Histories*, other fourth-century works that describe the collapse of Spartan power generally favor explanations that revolve around the oppressive policies Sparta implemented to ensure its dominance over the other Greek states. Xenophon, who did not place a high degree of significance on the *politeia* in his *Hellenica*, claims divine retribution brought on by Spartan misbehavior led to the Spartan collapse (5.3.27-41, 6.4.3). Similarly, after describing Lysander's attempts to supplant the kings of Sparta (14.13.1-8), Diodorus does not mention the

⁷⁸ Wickersham 1994, 148-149.

general again, and, in the midst of his description of Spartan conquests and overly harsh rule, blames the collapse of Spartan hegemony on their excesses:

They were defeated, namely, at Leuctra first, where they lost many of their citizen soldiers and their king Cleombrotus fell; and later, when they fought at Mantinea, they were utterly routed and hopelessly lost their supremacy. For fortune has a knack, when men vaunt themselves too highly, of laying them unexpectedly low and so teaching them to hope for nothing in excess (15.33.3, trans. C. H. Oldfather).

Neither historian used *politeiai* to explain hegemony, and thus changes to the Lycurgan *politeia* cannot account for Sparta's downfall.

However, works that treat *politeiai* as important also explain the downfall of Spartan hegemony in terms of violations of the laws of Lycurgus.⁷⁹ In the *Lakedaimonion Politeia*, in which Xenophon sees the *politeia* as the root of Spartan power, Spartan hegemony ends when Sparta moves away from the policies implemented by Lycurgus (14.1-7). Xenophon cites the accumulation of wealth, introduction of metallic coinage, and establishment of direct Spartan rule over defeated peoples as the chief violations of the *politeia*. Though Lysander is not mentioned by name in the *Lakedaimonion Politeia*, in the *Hellenica* Xenophon discusses his role in establishing Spartan rule over foreign states (3.4.2).

We should also note that in the only preserved description of a loss of hegemony in the *Histories*, the downfall of Miletus described in F183 (*apud* Athenaeus 523e), Ephoros highlighted the role of wealth. Here the Milesian hegemony disintegrates when luxury corrupts their state:

But the Milesians, as long as they abstained from luxury [οὐκ ἐτρούφω], conquered the Scythians, as Ephorus says, and both founded the cities on the Hellespont and settled the Black Sea region with famous cities, and everyone hastened to Miletus. But when they were conquered by pleasure and luxury [ἡδονῇ καὶ τροφῇ], the *andreion* of the city was put to flight, as Aristotle says, and a certain proverb was based on them, "Once upon a time long ago the Milesians were brave" (trans P. Christesen).

⁷⁹ The loss of Spartan hegemony is not discussed in the *Laws*.

As mentioned earlier, this event most likely functioned as a paradigm for the rise and fall of hegemonic states in the *Histories*.⁸⁰ In this light, Lysander's role in the introduction of wealth into Sparta must assume an important role in Ephoros' work.

Ephoros clearly believed that Lysander was instrumental in the decline of Sparta.⁸¹ He was not successful in establishing his own *politeia* in Sparta, as his attempt to introduce coinage into the state was rebuffed and his changes to the monarchy were never proposed. However, his actions significantly unraveled the Spartan *politeia* and ultimately lead to its downfall. Just as Lycurgus had set in place the conditions that enabled hegemony, Lysander introduced the forces that brought about the decline of Sparta.

⁸⁰ See p. 20 of this thesis.

⁸¹ Cf. Tigerstedt 1965-78, 221. Tigerstedt, who instead claims Ephoros attributed the decline to Agesilaos, does not consider the effects of Lysander's introduction of wealth into Sparta. Wickersham claims that Ephoros believed "leading men" sought to change the Lycurgan *politeia* Wickersham 1994, 147-150, with one of those men being Lysander.

Minos and Rhadamanthys

Individuals also figure prominently in Ephoros' portrayal of the mythological period of Crete's past. This chapter begins with a discussion of the portrayals of Minos and Rhadamanthys in Homer and Hesiod before turning to the Classical representations of the Cretans. The character of Minos, the son of Zeus and Europa, occurred frequently in Greek literature. Prior to Ephoros, he was portrayed, at various points, as a ruler of Knossos who consulted with Zeus, a king who established Cretan thalassocracy, an unjust tyrant who subdued Athens, the chief justice in the afterlife, and, starting in the fourth century, as a *nomothetes* who established a Cretan *politeia* (though in this role he is subordinated to Zeus). The character of Rhadamanthys occupies a less prominent position as Minos' brother and fellow judge in the underworld. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the fragments in Ephoros which present his opinion of key individuals in early Cretan history. I argue that Ephoros created a new Rhadamanthys who predated Minos and who was responsible for the establishment of the Cretan *politeia* and a King Kres who established Cretan thalassocracy. For Ephoros, Rhadamanthys' connection with Zeus was simply a fiction created for the sake of lending legitimacy to his reforms. In the *Histories*, Minos was merely as an imitator who copied the actions and, presumably, the *politeia* of Rhadamanthys. Rhadamanthys thus emerges as the single most important figure in early Cretan history, one who possessed significant historical agency as he implemented the *politeia* that ensured Cretan *eleutheria*.

Both Homer and Hesiod mention Minos and Rhadamanthys a number of times in their works. The vast majority of the references occur in genealogies. One quote, however, was fundamental to later representations of the two Cretans. It occurs in Book 19 of the *Odyssey*,

when Odysseus presents himself to Penelope as a wandering Cretan who had once hosted

Odysseus:

There is a land called Crete...
ringed by the wine-dark sea with rolling whitecaps—
handsome country, fertile, thronged with people
well past counting—boasting ninety cities,
language mixing with language side-by-side.
First come the Achaeans, then the native Cretans,
hardy, gallant in action, then Cydonian clansmen,
Dorians living in three tribes, and proud Pelasgians last.
Central to all their cities is magnificent Cnossos,
the site where Minos ruled and each ninth year
conferred with almighty Zeus himself. Minos,
father of my father, Deucalion, that bold heart. (172-180, trans R. Fagles, ll. 193-205).

Here Homer portrays Minos as a monarch whose rule was advised by Zeus. He does not, however, explicitly present him as a legal reformer, nor does he describe any particular institutions or codes implemented. Considering that the poem is neither a political treatise nor an attempt to explain and order history, such data are extraneous to Homer's narrative.

Minos also figured prominently in Classical Attic literature that has only survived in fragments. As these works do not survive, we must rely on later accounts to understand the role Minos played in them. A number of fifth-century tragedians and historians appear to have treated Minos to some degree. There are a significant number of plays with titles that suggest that the Cretan was a key character in the work, and fragments of logographers such as Pherecydes of Leros and Hellanicus suggest that they portrayed Minos as a harsh ruler and an enemy of Athens.⁸² Rhadamanthys is also mentioned in these works, though the fragmentary state of the works does not allow for any significant conclusions to be made about his role in those works. The lack of evidence precludes more from being said here.

⁸² Morrow 1960, 23.

Herodotus did not treat Minos at length in the *History*, and Rhadamanthys is not mentioned at any point in his work. When Herodotus discusses Minos, he focuses on the Cretan's role as king and creator of a Cretan thalassocracy. The first mention of Minos occurs in Book 1, when Herodotus describes the army of Harpagus:

Harpagus, having subdued Ionia, marched against the Carians and Caunians and Lycians, bringing with him, in his own army, the Ionians and Aeolians. Now, among these, the Carians had come to the mainland from the islands; for in the old days these Carians were subjects of Minos and were called Leleges when they possessed the islands. They paid no tribute to Minos, according to the furthest back that I could reach from hearsay; but whenever Minos made demand of them, they used to man ships for him; and, inasmuch as Minos conquered a great deal of land and was very successful in war, the Carian race was the most regarded of all at that time—far the most so. They made three discoveries of which the Greeks made use. They are the people who began the practice of binding plumes on helmets and painting designs on shields, and they were the first who made grips for the shields themselves. Before this time those who were wont to use shields carried them without handholds, guiding them by leathern baldrics, which they hung around their necks and left shoulders. Then, a long time afterwards, the Dorians and Ionians drove the Carians from the islands, and that is how these latter came to the mainland. At any rate, that is the story the Cretans tell of the Carians, though it is not what the Carians themselves say. The Carians declare that they have always lived on the mainland and were always called by the same name as now. As evidence they point to the ancient temple of Carian Zeus in Mylasa, to which Lydians and Mysians are admitted as brothers of the Carians; for Lydus and Mys, say the Carians, were the brother of Car. These are indeed admitted, but others, even those who speak the same language as the Carians, are not admitted if they are of another national origin (1.171, trans. D. Grene).

Herodotus expresses no interest in any reforms implemented by Minos, who is portrayed as a king but not a noteworthy *nomothetes*. From the passage, it is evident that Minos ruled a large kingdom, and his control of the islands and use of Carian sailors suggests that he drew a significant portion of his power from naval forces. A few sentences later, Herodotus reveals that Minos assumed the throne of Crete after a dynastic struggle:

There was a rivalry in Crete about the throne between Sarpedon and Minos, Europa's sons. Minos won out in the struggle; he drove out Sarpedon and his party, and, when these latter were expelled, they came to the land of Milyas in Asia (1.173).

Herodotus continues into an anthropological discussion of the traditions and behaviors of the descendants of Sarpedon. Another significant passage on Minos occurs in Book 3:

Polycrates is the first of the Greeks we know to lay plans for mastery of the sea [*thalassokrateein*] except for Minos of Cnossus and any of those that before him were lords of the sea. But Polycrates is the first of the human race to do so, and he had high hopes of mastering Ionia and the islands (3.122).

Again, Herodotus asserts that Minos' power was based upon the strength of his navy, but here portrays him as a heroic character who is distinct from humanity; the son of Europa and Zeus was not treated as a man, and his naval empire is excluded from those of men. Thus what historical agency he possessed as the creator of a naval empire is limited to the mythological past. The final discussion of Minos occurs at 7.169-7.170, where Herodotus explains why the Cretans did not join the alliance against Xerxes:

So they tried to fool the Greeks. But the Cretans, when the appointed envoys of the Greeks tried to get them on their side, did as follows. They sent envoys to Delphi to ask the god whether it would be for their benefit to go to the aid of the Greeks. The Pythia answered, "You fools, are you not satisfied with the tears that Minos sent you in his wrath for the help you gave Menelaus, because the others would not help avenge his death in Camicus, but you helped them take vengeance for a woman stolen away by a barbarian from Sparta?" When the Cretans heard that, they gave over any project of helping the Greeks. The story goes that Minos, when he sought for Daedalus, went to Sicania (which is now called Sicily) and there met a violent death.

Herodotus then recounts failed attempts on the part of the Cretans to exact vengeance from the Sicilians for the death of Minos, the failure of that expedition, and the colonies that were created as a result of the Cretans' disordered retreat. At 7.171, he dates the Trojan War to the third generation after Minos' death.

None of these passages suggests that Herodotus viewed Minos as a singularly important individual. No causal relationship is established in the passages on the Cretan thalassocracy. Herodotus almost certainly viewed the emergence of a Cretan thalassocracy as the product of the geography and culture of the Cretans, as he used these criteria throughout his work. Lacking a

specific alternative, we cannot assume a different causal force is at play in these passages. It is also worth noting that Herodotus devoted relatively little space to the discussion of Crete, and Minos is only referenced in digressions where Herodotus explains the customs of nations treated in his work. Finally, Herodotus' emphasis on Minos' mythological nature further separates him from history.

Thucydides viewed Minos primarily as the creator of a naval superpower, while Rhadamanthys is not mentioned in Thucydides' work. As was the case in Herodotus, Minos is portrayed as the first ruler to have established a thalassocracy:

And the first person known to us by tradition as having established a navy is Minos. He made himself master of what is now called the Hellenic sea, and ruled over the Cyclades, into most of which he sent the first colonies, expelling the Carians and appointing his own sons governors; and thus did his best to put down piracy in those waters, a necessary step to secure the revenues for his own use (1.4, trans. J. H. Dent).

Thucydides' account differs from Herodotus' in that he says that Minos made the seas safe for travel, established colonies in the Cyclades, and drove out rather than subdued the Carians.

Because of his actions, the Aegean region grew prosperous and stronger states were formed:

But as soon as Minos had formed his navy, communication by sea became easier, as he colonized most of the islands, and thus expelled the malefactors. The coast populations now began to apply themselves more closely to the acquisition of wealth, and their life became more settled; some even began to build themselves walls on the strength of their newly-acquired riches. For the love of gain would reconcile the weaker to the dominion of the stronger, and the possession of capital enabled the more powerful to reduce the smaller towns to subjection (1.8).

For Thucydides, Minos influenced history by enabling the acquisition of wealth, which in turn led to the creation of powerful states in the Aegean basin that subdued their neighbors.

Thucydides then skips to the Trojan War and discusses the events leading up to that expedition.

While Minos is clearly important to Thucydides, he is important because of his military power; it was his naval strength that enabled Minos to establish control of the seas and build his kingdom.

Thucydides' emphasis on sea power is not unique to his account of Minos. The *Archaeologia* traces control of the seas down to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War; Thucydides describes the navies of Agamemnon (1.9), Corinth and Corcyra (1.13), the Ionians (1.13), Polycrates (1.13), the Phocaeans (1.13), Sicily (1.14), and Athens (1.18-1.19). Again, what historical agency Minos is given is limited to the mythological past, and he is not portrayed as a significant character for Thucydides' history.

Xenophon only mentions Minos once in his oeuvre and never discusses Rhadamanthys.

The passage which addresses Minos occurs in the *Memorabilia*:

Indeed! have you not heard how Daedalus was seized by Minos because of his wisdom, and was forced to be his slave, and was robbed of his country and his liberty, and essaying to escape with his son, lost the boy and could not save himself, but was carried off to the barbarians and again lived as a slave there? (4.2.33, trans. E. C. Marchant).

The reference to Minos conveys no information of significance, and the lack of attention devoted to the Cretan ruler throughout his works suggests that Xenophon did not view Minos as a key figure in Greek history.

Plato continues the established trend of treating Minos as the creator of a naval kingdom, and he is the first known author who adds the creation of a Cretan *politeia* to Minos' resumé; Rhadamanthys is also given a place in Plato's writings. Both Cretans are mentioned in the opening of the *Laws*:

ATH. To whom do you ascribe the authorship of your legal arrangements, Strangers? To a god or to some man?

CLIN. To a god, Stranger, most rightfully to a god. We Cretans call Zeus our lawgiver; while in Lacedaemon, where our friend here has his home, I believe they claim Apollo as theirs. Is not that so, Megillus?

MEG. Yes

ATH. Do you then, like Homer, say that Minos used to go every ninth year to hold converse with his father Zeus, and that he was guided by his divine oracles in laying down the laws [*nomoi*] for your cities?

CLIN. So our people say. And they say also that his brother Rhadamanthys,--no doubt you have heard the name,--was exceedingly just. And certainly we Cretans would

maintain that he won this title owing to his righteous administration of justice in those days (624a-b, trans. R. G. Bury).

This is the first extant instance in Greek literature where the conference between Zeus and Minos results in specific *nomoi*. As Paula Perlman has noted, by linking the laws of Minos to Zeus, Plato portrays Zeus as the *nomothetes* and gives Minos a “rather subordinate role;”⁸³ Minos’ laws are the product of a god, not a man. Minos and Rhadamanthys appear with some frequency throughout the *Laws*. Earlier in the thesis we have already seen Minos paired with Lycurgus later in Book 1 of the *Laws* (631d). Here Plato cites Minos as an example of a lawgiver who had correctly ordered divine and human virtues in his *politeia*. In Book 4, Minos is again mentioned, this time regarding his subjugation of Athens:

When Minos, once upon a time, reduced the people of Attica to a grievous payment of tribute, he was very powerful by sea, whereas they possessed no warships at that time such as they have now, nor was their country so rich in timber that they could easily supply themselves with a naval force (706a).

Minos is linked with sea power, as had been the case in the works of the fifth-century historians. For Plato, however, this bears a negative connotation, as he immediately proceeds to criticize naval forces:

And indeed it would have profited them to lose seventy times seven children rather than to become marines instead of staunch foot-soldiers; for marines are habituated to jumping ashore frequently and running back at full speed to their ships, and they think no shame of not dying boldly at their posts when the enemy attack; and excuses are readily made for them, as a matter of course, when they fling away their arms and betake themselves to what they describe as “no dishonorable flight.” These “exploits” are the usual result of employing naval soldiery, and they merit, not “infinite praise,” but precisely the opposite; for one ought never to habituate men to base habits, and least of all the noblest section of the citizens (706b-d).

The sea is portrayed as a corrosive force throughout the *Laws*:

For if the State was to be on the sea-coast, and to have fine harbors, and to be deficient in many products, instead of productive of everything,—in that case it would need a mighty

⁸³ Perlman 2005, 292.

savior and divine lawgivers, if, with such a character, it was to avoid having a variety of luxurious and depraved habits (704d).

Reliance upon the sea is seen as a corrupting force because it produced trade and thus luxury; Plato also saw the external contacts that resulted from trade in a negative light (705c-d).⁸⁴ The view of Minos in the *Laws* is thus contradictory, as he is portrayed both as a wise lawgiver who implemented a *politeia* that correctly ordered and incentivized Plato's optimal civic virtues, yet he was also a proponent of enervating naval power.

Rhadamanthys is treated on his own in Book 12. Here Plato praises the manner in which he evaluated legal complaints, though Plato believes the Cretan's methods are now outdated:

Rhadamanthys deserves admiration for the way in which, as we are told, he judged cases of law, in that he perceived that the men of his time had a clear belief in the existence of gods,—and naturally so, seeing that most men at that time were the offspring of gods, he himself among others, as the story declares. Probably he thought that he ought not to entrust lawsuits to any man, but only to gods, from whom he obtained verdicts that were both simple and speedy; for he administered an oath to the disputants regarding each matter in dispute, and thus secured a speedy and safe settlement. But nowadays, when, as we say, a certain section of mankind totally disbelieve in gods, and others hold that they pay no regard to men, while a third party, consisting of the most and worst of men, suppose that in return for small offerings and flatteries the gods lend them aid in committing large robberies, and often set them free from great penalties,—under such conditions, for men as they now are, the device of Rhadamanthys would no longer be appropriate in actions at law (948b-c).

Plato's emphasis on Rhadamanthys focuses on the justice of his legal administration; he is not presented as a figure responsible for the success of the Cretan state.

The brothers are also mentioned in the *Gorgias*. Socrates argues that men fear judgment for the misdeeds committed in life rather than death itself and explains how Zeus ensured that fair judgment was rendered in the afterlife. Socrates then states that Zeus appointed Minos and Rhadamanthys as judges with the following words:

Now I, knowing all this before you, have appointed sons of my own to be judges; two from Asia, Minos and Rhadamanthus, and one from Europe, Aeacus. These, when their life is

⁸⁴ Perlman 2005, 294-295.

ended, shall give judgement in the meadow at the dividing of the road, whence are the two ways leading, one to the Isles of the Blest, and the other to Tartarus. And those who come from Asia shall Rhadamanthus try, and those from Europe, Aeacus; and to Minos I will give the privilege of the final decision, if the other two be in any doubt; that the judgement upon this journey of mankind may be supremely just. (523e-524a, trans. W. R. Lamb)

The same judicial roles for Minos and Rhadamanthys are repeated at 526c and in the *Apologia* at 41a.

The two Cretans receive significantly more attention in the dialogue *Minos*, which was attributed to Plato in antiquity but is no longer believed to be the work of the philosopher. The date of composition for the work is uncertain, but as it has been proposed that the work was in existence prior to the publication of Ephoros' work, it will be examined here.⁸⁵ Pseudo-Plato begins by describing Minos and Rhadamanthys as just rulers and, together, the source of Crete's admirable legislation:

- SOC. But whence is it that the best of those ordinances [*nomoi*] come? Do you know?
COM. From Crete, so they say.
SOC. Then the people there use the most ancient laws [*nomoi*] in Greece?
COM. Yes.
SOC. Then do you know who were their good kings? Minos and Rhadamanthus, the sons of Zeus and Europa; those laws [*nomoi*] were theirs.
COM. Rhadamanthus, they do say, Socrates, was a just man; but Minos was a savage sort of person, harsh and unjust.
SOC. Your tale, my excellent friend, is a fiction of Attic tragedy (318c-d, trans. W. R. Lamb).

⁸⁵ The author of the *Minos* and Ephoros each employ an unorthodox exegesis of a passage on Minos in Homer (*Il.* 19.178-179), an exegesis which is similar to Plato's interpretation of the passage in the *Laws* (624b). This has led Morrow to conclude that 1) Ephoros was familiar with Plato's writings on this passage, 2) that the *Minos*, or at least the closing sections of the piece that discuss the Cretan lawgiver, were written either by Plato or by one of his contemporaries, and 3) that Ephoros was familiar with the *Laws* and the *Minos* (Morrow 1960, 23-24). See also Shorey 1933, 425 for support of this view of the *Minos*. Morrow's views represent the minority; the scholarly consensus is that the work was not written by Plato. See Lamb 1925, 386; Thesleff 1982, 229-230; Szlezák 2002-; and works cited therein. However, for the sake of thoroughness, the work is treated here. Regardless of the author, the date of composition of the *Minos* is much less certain. As some believe the work was written during Plato's life (e.g., Morrow 1960, 35-39 and Thesleff 1982, 229-230), the work is treated here.

Pseudo-Plato then cites Homer and Hesiod to justify his opinion that Minos was not an unjust ruler before presenting his summary:

For surely Minos did not, like an inferior person, (320b) think one thing and do another, different from what he thought: no, this intercourse, as I say, was held by means of discussion for education [*paideia*] in virtue [*arete*]. Wherefore he ordained for his people these very laws [*nomoi*], which have made Crete happy through the length of time, and Sparta happy also, since she began to use them; for they are divine.

Rhadamanthus was a good man indeed, for he had been educated [*epepaideuto*] by Minos; he had, however, been educated, (320c) not in the whole of the kingly art, but in one subsidiary to the kingly, enough for presiding in law courts; so that he was spoken of as a good judge. For Minos used him as guardian of the law [*nomophylax*] in the city, and Talos as the same for the rest of Crete. For Talos thrice a year made a round of the villages, guarding the laws [*nomoi*] in them, by holding their laws [*nomoi*] inscribed on brazen tablets, which gave him his name of “brazen” (320a-c, trans. W. R. M. Lamb).

For the author of the *Minos*, Minos was the embodiment of a virtuously educated ruler, and his laws were responsible for the success of Crete and, indirectly through Lycurgus (318c-d), of Sparta. Rhadamanthys served as the arbitrator of the justice established by Minos’ legislation. In the *Minos*, the laws implemented by Minos do significantly influence the course of Greek history by bringing *eudaimonia* to Crete and indirectly to Sparta. If the *Minos*, as Morrow has suggested, predates Ephoros, then this is the first example of Minos being accorded significant historical agency and likely influenced the historian’s work.

Isocrates references Minos’ control of the seas and cites Minos and Rhadamanthys as epitomes of virtue. Both instances occur in the *Panathenaicus*. The reference to Minos’ and Rhadamanthys’ virtue occurs late in the work, when Isocrates gives a list of mythological figures who were praised on account of their “practice of reverence in relation to the gods and of justice in relation to mankind and of wisdom in relation to all activities in general” (204, trans. G.

Norlin):

These things being so, if you speak the truth when you assert that they [the Spartans] were the discoverers of the best ways of life [the virtues cited in 204], then it must follow that

those who lived many generations before the Spartans settled there had no part in them—neither those who made the expedition against Troy nor those who were of the generation of Heracles and Theseus or of Minos, son of Zeus, or Rhadamanthus or Aeacus or any of the others who are celebrated in song for the virtues which I have mentioned, but that all of them have in this respect a reputation which is false (205).

Isocrates makes this argument to rebuke his Laconophilic pupil, who, he tells us at 202, had claimed that “they [the Spartans] deserved the gratitude of all men because they had discovered the best ways of life and not only followed these ways themselves but had taught them to the rest of the world.” In writing a panegyric of Athens that seeks to contrast the generosity of Athens to the parochialism of Sparta,⁸⁶ it is not surprising that Isocrates would seek to discredit Sparta by disassociating her from the virtues his student had linked to them. The list indicates that Isocrates viewed the two Cretans as moral exemplars but tells us nothing of his conception of their role in history. The other mention of Minos is a passing reference to his naval empire during a discussion of the Athenians’ justice in their conquest of the Cyclades:

First they took the islands of the Cyclades, about which there had been much contention during the overlordship of Minos of Crete and which finally were occupied by the Carians, and, having driven out the latter, refrained from appropriating the lands of these islands for themselves, but instead settled upon them those of the Hellenes who were most lacking in means of subsistence (43).

Again, Isocrates’ words provide no indication of his views on Minos’ historical agency, though Minos is again represented as the leader of a thalassocracy.

Up to this point in Greek literature, Minos and Rhadamanthys have had clearly defined roles. Both brothers are viewed as judges in the afterlife, and Rhadamanthys holds this position in life as well. Minos is portrayed as an imperial overlord, a ruler who was given laws by Zeus, or both. Ephoros modified and adapted this tradition in order to cause Minos and Rhadamanthys to better fit within his historical narrative. He recast the tradition around Rhadamanthys and gave

⁸⁶ Norlin 1929, 368-371.

him a significant degree of historical agency while simultaneously reducing the significance of Minos as a historical figure.

Ephoros devoted a greater degree of attention to Minos and Rhadamanthys than his predecessors. In the discussion of Ephoros' portrayal of Lycurgus, we have already seen that Ephoros rationalized myths concerning Minos and Rhadamanthys (F31a, 32, 34 *apud* Theon *Progymnastika* 95.23-96.4). Three key fragments provide significant insights into Ephoros' portrayal of the Cretan lawgivers. The first is F147 (*apud* Strabo 10.4.8):

But Minos is said to have used as seaport Amnisus, where is the temple of Eileithuia. In earlier times Cnossus was called Caeratus, bearing the same name as the river which flows past it. According to history, Minos was an excellent law-giver, and also the first to gain the mastery of the sea; and he divided the island into three parts and founded a city in each part, Cnossus in the . . . And it, too, lies to the north. As Ephorus states, Minos was an emulator of a certain Rhadamanthys of early times, a man most just and bearing the same name as Minos's brother, who is reputed to have been the first to civilize the island by establishing laws [*nomima*] and by uniting cities under one city as metropolis and by setting up constitutions [*politeiai*], alleging that he brought from Zeus the several decrees which he promulgated. So, in imitation of Rhadamanthys, Minos would go up every nine years, as it appears, to the cave of Zeus, tarry there, and come back with commandments drawn up in writing, which he alleged [*ephasken*] were ordinances of Zeus; and it was for this reason that the poet says, "there Minos reigned as king, who held converse with great Zeus every ninth year.

Such is the statement of Ephorus; but again the early writers have given a different account of Minos, which is contrary to that of Ephorus, saying that he was tyrannical, harsh, and an exactor of tribute, representing in tragedy the story of the Minotaur and the Labyrinth, and the adventures of Theseus and Daedalus (trans. H. L. Jones).

The initial comments cannot be used to determine Ephoros' views on Minos, as he is not cited until later in the passage. However, the section that is attributed to Ephoros discusses both Minos and Rhadamanthys. Ephoros casts both individuals in a light different from that of his predecessors. Ephoros invented a new Rhadamanthys (a predecessor of Minos rather than his brother of the same name) and describes him as an early lawgiver responsible for civilizing Crete

and uniting cities under one metropolis while creating *politeiai*.⁸⁷ The fragment also tells us that Ephoros did not consider Minos a harsh and tyrannical “extractor of tribute,” as had become standard in the literature of the period and instead described him in a much more favorable light.⁸⁸ Interestingly, the divine origin of Rhadamanthys’ laws is called into question; Ephoros claims that the senior Rhadamanthys and Minos themselves declared that they received the laws from Zeus, but does not confirm their assertion. By separating the laws from the god, Ephoros transforms the Cretans into actual acting *nomothetai*. This is especially significant in light of the second key fragment (F149 *apud* Polybius 10.4.16-22), which has been cited earlier. The relevant sections are repeated here:

(16) As for their constitution, which is described by Ephorus, it might suffice to tell in a cursory way its most important provisions. The lawgiver, he says, seems to take it for granted that liberty is a state's greatest good, for this alone makes property belong specifically to those who have acquired it, whereas in a condition of slavery everything belongs to the rulers and not to the ruled; but those who have liberty must guard it; now harmony ensues when dissension, which is the result of greed and luxury, is removed; for when all citizens live a self-restrained and simple life there arises neither envy nor arrogance nor hatred towards

⁸⁷ The creation of a second individual of the same name is not unheard of in Greek literature. Both Timaeus (*FGrH* 566 F127) and Apollodorus (*FrGH* 244 F64) suggest that two men named Lycurgus existed in different times. It seems that they did this to rectify chronological problems concerning the origin of the Olympics (see Christesen 2007, 152-153). The available evidence does not enable us to reconstruct the narrative of the *Histories* accurately enough to provide a structural explanation for why Ephoros would want to create a new Rhadamanthys and rearrange early Cretan history around this individual. The fragments also do not explain why this new individual would be Rhadamanthys, who up to this point in Greek literature has been a relatively inconsequential figure. Perlman has suggested that Ephoros rearranged early Cretan history because of the negative reputation that afflicted the island and its lawgivers (Perlman 2005, 295-297). However, as we have seen, this reputation was confined to the Attic tragedians; neither Herodotus nor Thucydides cast the Minoan thalassocracy in a negative light, Plato explicitly rejects the portrayal of Minos as an oppressive ruler, and Isocrates presents Minos and Rhadamanthys as examples of moral men. We should note that Diodorus, who drew extensively from Ephoros, also engages in a reinterpretation of early Cretan history. For Diodorus, Rhadamanthys was the primary Cretan lawgiver, while his brother Minos assumed the throne. They were the sons of Zeus and Europa. It was this Minos’ grandson, also named Minos, who established the Cretan thalassocracy, subdued Athens, and forced Theseus to face the Minotaur (4.60.3-61.5).

⁸⁸ Lasserre 1971, 7: 138 and Perlman 2005, 297. Cf. Morrow 1960, 38.

those who are like them [...] (17) Ephorus says, for, in the first place, one should not draw evidence as to antiquity from the present state of things, for both peoples have undergone a complete reversal; for instance, the Cretans in earlier times were masters of the sea, and hence the proverb, "The Cretan does not know the sea," is applied to those who pretend not to know what they do know, although now the Cretans have lost their fleet [...] (19) and after learning from him the manner in which both Rhadamanthys in earlier times and Minos in later times published their laws to men as from Zeus, and after sojourning in Egypt also and learning among other things their institutions, and, according to some writers, after meeting Homer, who was living in Chios, he [Lycurgus] sailed back to his homeland, and found his brother's son, Charilaüs the son of Polydectes, reigning as king; and then he set out to frame the laws, making visits to the god at Delphi, and bringing thence the god's decrees, just as Minos and his house had brought their ordinances from the cave of Zeus, most of his being similar to theirs (trans. H. L. Jones).

As we have seen, for Ephoros, hegemony is the result of *eleutheria*. As the Cretan *politeia* in Ephoros is purely the product of mortal actions, the *nomothetes* who implemented it clearly possesses significant historical agency since Cretan power is a direct byproduct of his actions, and, as Lycurgus modeled his *politeia* upon the Cretan precedent, Spartan hegemony is an indirect byproduct. From the fragment, it is not possible to deduce for certain which lawgiver, Rhadamanthys or Minos, was responsible for implementing the *politeia*, though Ephoros' claims in F147 that Rhadamanthys implemented *politeiai* and that Minos imitated the earlier lawgiver suggest that Ephoros may be referring to Rhadamanthys here. The seniority of Rhadamanthys is again asserted in F149, and again Ephoros claims that both lawgivers falsely presented Zeus as the source of their laws. There is also a reference to an early Cretan fleet that was a significant force on the sea, though this fragment does not indicate who was responsible for the creation of that fleet. A passage in Pseudo-Skymnos indicates that neither Rhadamanthys nor Minos was responsible for the thalassocracy:

Crete [is] an island that lies opposite the Peloponnese, great in respect to size and exceedingly wealthy, stretching lengthwise in the sea from Cape Malea in Laconia to Dorian Rhodes and being inhabited from an early date by a great mass of people and *poleis*. The most ancient inhabitants of the island are those called the Eteocretans. They say that the Cretans were the first in Hellas to rule over the sea and to subject the island *poleis*, which

Ephoros said were jointly colonized by the Cretans. They say that the island is named after a certain Kres, the autochthonous king (*Periegesis* 535-49, trans. P. Christesen).

The fragment is the first known reference to king Kres. Based on the proximity of Kres to the Cretan thalassocracy, Perlman has argued that Ephoros believed that Kres was responsible for the Cretan naval empire.⁸⁹ Minos is thus left as a lawgiver who imitated the actions and, presumably, the *politeia* of his predecessor Rhadamanthys. A final fragment, F174 (*apud* Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 1.170.3, cited earlier) also suggests that Ephoros believed that Minos presented his legislation as a product of Zeus.

The chronology of Ephoros' Crete is somewhat unclear. As Perlman has noted, "Ephoros...presents us with an autochthonous king Kres who founded the Cretan thalassocracy, a senior Rhadamanthys who civilized Crete, and a Minos who later promulgated his laws ὡς παρὰ τοῦ Διός."⁹⁰ As it seems unlikely to me that a maritime empire would emerge from an uncivilized state, Rhadamanthys should be placed first, followed an indefinite period later by Kres, and, after another indefinite period, Minos. The role of Minos is not clear, though he appears to have presented his laws in imitation of Rhadamanthys. It should be noted that, according to Ephoros, Rhadamanthys, not Minos, was the origin of the Cretan *politeia*. For Ephoros, historical agency amongst the Cretan rulers seems to have been concentrated in Rhadamanthys, as he was the author of the *politeia* that provided Crete with its *eleutheria*. This is a significant deviation from the preexisting literary precedent, which treated Minos as the key individual in early Cretan history. By creating an entirely new figure in Cretan history and portraying him as the author of the *politeia*, Ephoros places a high degree of significance upon Rhadamanthys.

⁸⁹ Perlman 2005, 296.

⁹⁰ Perlman 2005, 297.

Ephoros' modification of tradition further emphasizes the importance of the individual in the *Histories*. If Ephoros simply wished to explain early Cretan history as the result of the actions of a specific individual, Minos would be the obvious choice. By creating a new Rhadamanthys that contradicts the established version of events, Ephoros draws special attention to this individual. We must remember that Rhadamanthys distinctly belongs to the *spatium mythicum*, and recasting details of this period does not present a significant challenge to the historical validity of Ephoros' work. It appears that Ephoros took advantage of this opportunity in order to emphasize the importance of individuals in explaining history.⁹¹ The retelling of the myth draws attention to the role of the individual in establishing the Cretan state. By linking the Cretan and Spartan *politeiai*, Ephoros connects an important mythological figure with the Lycurgus historical world. That both *nomothetai* display significant historical agency indicates the importance of individual actors within the theoretical framework of the *Histories*.

⁹¹ Cf. Perlman 2005, 295-297, who argues that Ephoros' retelling of early Cretan history was an attempt to "rehabilitate the reputation of the king [Minos] or, perhaps more generally, the reputation of Crete as a well-governed land."

Epameinondas

The general Epameinondas is perhaps the most significant individual to emerge from Thebes in the fourth century. Unfortunately, the majority of histories written during the period are lost. Within the extant sources, he first appears in Xenophon, whose treatment of the general is as notable for what he excludes from the narrative as for what he includes. Ephoros, in contrast, gave Epameinondas a significant role in the *Histories* as the individual fully responsible for Theban hegemony.

The only extant work prior to the *Histories* which discusses Epameinondas is that of Xenophon.⁹² Xenophon believed that Epameinondas was less important than divine actions for explaining the results of the struggle between Thebes and Sparta. His treatment of Epameinondas in the *Hellenica* focuses primarily on his role as a general and statesman (e.g., 7.1.41-42 and 7.4.40). Xenophon's key discussion of Epameinondas occurs in his account of the latter's final invasion of the Peloponnese (7.5.1-27). Here Xenophon focuses his narrative on the tactics employed by the general in this campaign. However, in the description of the Battle of Mantinea at 7.5.25 there is a clear sign that Epameinondas was important in this limited time:

When, however, he had himself fallen, those who were left proved unable to take full advantage thereafter even of the victory; but although the opposing phalanx had fled before them, their hoplites did not kill a single man or advance beyond the spot where the collision had taken place; and although the cavalry also had fled before them, their cavalry in like manner did not pursue and kill either horsemen or hoplites, but slipped back timorously, like beaten men, through the lines of the flying enemy. Furthermore, while the intermingled footmen and the peltasts, who had shared in the victory of the cavalry, did make their way like victors to the region of the enemy's left wing, most of them were there slain by the Athenians (trans. C. L. Brownson).

For Xenophon, the Thebans were only able to achieve victory under Epameinondas' leadership, as after the moment of his death their advance immediately ceases. As a result, the battle ended

⁹² Two of Ephoros' contemporaries, Aeschines (*De Falsa Legatione* 105) and Callisthenes (*FrGH* 124 F26 *apud* Plutarch *Agesilaus* 34.4), both reference Epameinondas, though not in a significant way. Moreover, these works were likely written after the *Histories*.

in a draw, with both sides having a recognized claim to victory (7.5.26-27). We should note that Xenophon attributes this outcome to divine intervention rather than Theban failures, as the draw was mandated by divine will. In fact, the entire account of his final campaign is filled with references to chance and divine intervention (e.g., 7.5.8, 10, 12-15),⁹³ and these same views on causation are seen in Xenophon's treatment of the Leuctra campaign (e.g., 5.4.1, 6.4.2).⁹⁴

Xenophon's account tellingly leaves out several of Epameinondas' key actions found in other accounts of the period. Epameinondas is not mentioned in the narrative of Leuctra and its aftermath (6.4.1-26), and the account of the general's first invasion of the Peloponnese in 371 (6.5.1-32) fails to discuss Epameinondas' role in either the independence of Messene or the founding of Megalopolis, two events which are both later referenced in Book 7. Several scholars have taken these and other omissions as a sign of Xenophon's pro-Spartan bias.⁹⁵ Regardless of his motives, his exclusion of so many of Epameinondas' greatest achievements could not have occurred if he viewed the general as fundamentally reshaping the Greek world.

Finally, we must also note that, for Xenophon, there was no Theban hegemony. Modern tendencies to speak of a Theban hegemony after Leuctra draw on the language of later writers. In the *Hellenica*, the period of supposed Theban dominance, the 360s, "appear...as a time of rather constant warfare. Thebes never gets things settled as Sparta had them settled in 387/6...According to Xenophon's narrative Thebes has not got the Peloponnese, and without

⁹³ Breitenbach 1967, 1698.17-36 and Wickersham 1994, 113.

⁹⁴ Wickersham and Sterling have both noted the similarities between Xenophon's portrayal of Leuctra and Mantinea, emphasizing the role of divine will in both battles (Wickersham 1994, 113 and 113 n. 223 and Sterling 2004, 455).

⁹⁵ e.g., Cawkwell 1979, 301 n. on 6.1.1, 359 n. on 7.1.19; Buckler 1980, 264-268; and Cartledge 1987, 62-63, 238. Cf. Sterling 2004, who argues that "Xenophon's intent is to present what he considers appropriate reasons for condemning the Thebans' behavior, based on morality and political pragmatism" (453).

that she cannot be said to have really got hegemony.⁹⁶ Despite her victories, Xenophon believed that Thebes was unable to establish herself as the dominant power in Greece.

Three of the extant fragments and *testimonia* of Ephoros contain references to Epameinondas.⁹⁷ Two of these (T20 *apud* Polybius 12.25f and F85 *apud* Diogenes Laertius 2.53) mention his death in connection with the Battle of Mantinea. The third (F119 *apud* Strabo 9.2.2-5) demonstrates that Ephoros viewed Epameinondas as single-handedly responsible for the Theban hegemony. The fragment occurs in the midst of a long passage on Boeotia, in which Strabo quotes Ephoros a number of times. The relevant section, 9.2.2, is reproduced here:

Ephorus declares that Boeotia is superior to the countries of the bordering tribes, not only in fertility of soil, but also because it alone has three seas and has a greater number of good harbors; in the Crisaean and Corinthian Gulfs it receives the products of Italy and Sicily and Libya, while in the part which faces Euboea, since its seaboard branches off on either side of the Euripus, on one side towards Aulis and the territory of Tanagra and on the other towards Salganeus and Anthedon, the sea stretches unbroken in the one direction towards Egypt and Cyprus and the islands, and in the other direction towards Macedonia and the regions of the Propontis and the Hellespont. And he adds that Euboea has, in a way, been made a part of Boeotia by the Euripus, since the Euripus is so narrow and is spanned by a bridge to Euripus only two plethra long. Now he praises the country on account of these things; and he says that it is naturally well suited to hegemony [*hegemonia*], but that those who were from time to time its leaders neglected careful training [*agoge*] and education [*paideia*], and therefore, although they at times achieved success, they maintained it only for a short time, as is shown in the case of Epameinondas; for after he died the Thebans immediately lost the hegemony

⁹⁶ Wickersham 1994, 113-114.

⁹⁷ Wickersham suggests that F81-84 reveal that Ephoros recounted Epameinondas' campaigns and F216 discussed the foundation of Messene (Wickersham 1994, 124-125). While these are reasonable assumptions, since Epameinondas is not explicitly referenced, they are excluded from this argument. One further fragment references a man called Epameinondas, though this is not the Theban general. In the *Moralia*, Plutarch tells of a man who frequently recited Ephoros:

Just so, in my native town, there was a man who chanced to have read two or three books of Ephorus, and would always bore everybody to death and put every dinner-party to rout by invariably narrating the battle of Leuctra and its sequel; so he got the nickname of "Epameinondas" (F213 *apud* Plutarch *Moralia* 514c, trans. W. C. Helmbold).

The fragment tells us nothing about the general himself, but, as Wickersham has noted, it does suggest that Epameinondas dominated the discussion of the period between Leuctra and Mantinea in the *Histories*.

[*hegemonia*], having had only a taste of it; and that the cause of this was the fact that they belittled the value of learning [*logoi*] and of intercourse with mankind [*homilies tes pros anthropous*], and cared for the military virtues [*kata polemon arêtes*] alone. Ephorus should have added that these things are particularly useful in dealing with Greeks, although force is stronger than reason in dealing with the barbarians. And the Romans too, in ancient times, when carrying on war with savage tribes, needed no training of this kind, but from the time that they began to have dealings with more civilized tribes and races, they applied themselves to this training also, and so established themselves as lords of all (trans. H. L. Jones).

For Ephoros, Boeotia possessed the ideal geography for the acquisition of hegemony, yet was consistently unable to maintain possession of it for any significant length of time. The inability of Thebes to obtain supremacy required an explanation, and Ephoros found it in the character of the Theban people: Thebes lacked the *paideia* and *agoge* that, as other fragments have shown, would have enabled the state to eliminate *pleonexia* and *tryphe* and thus obtain *eleutheria* and *hegemonia*.⁹⁸ Wickersham and Parmeggiani have demonstrated that Ephoros believed Epameinondas enabled the Thebans to obtain hegemony during his lifetime because he provided the *paideia* that the population as a whole lacked.⁹⁹ He embodied this hegemonic trait to such an extent that statewide weaknesses were overcome and Thebes established itself as the hegemon over Greece.

We see the importance of Epameinondas in another section later in F119. It occurs in the midst of an overview of Theban history:

The Thebans, having conquered the Lacedaemonians in two battles, laid claim to supremacy over the Greeks. But Epameinondas fell in the battle, and consequently they were disappointed in this hope... (9.2.5).¹⁰⁰

During the two battles, Leuctra and Mantinea, Epameinondas was the key Theban general, and the Theban failure to maintain hegemony is the result of Epameinondas' death at Mantinea.

⁹⁸ Swoboda 1905, 2703.18-31; Momigliano 1935, 115-116; and Wickersham 1994, 133.

⁹⁹ Wickersham 1994, 133 and Parmeggiani 2005, 85-91.

¹⁰⁰ Strabo does not explicitly cite Ephoros in this passage. However, given his reliance on Ephoros elsewhere in this section and the similar sentiment regarding the immediacy of Thebes' decline expressed in F118, it seems safe to assume that Strabo is drawing from Ephoros.

Importantly, Ephoros suggests that the death of Epameinondas resulted in an immediate rather than gradual loss of hegemony. Furthermore, Theban hegemony cannot be attributed to Epameinondas' skills as a general, as the Thebans fail to obtain hegemony due to their excessive emphasis on military virtue.

Yet again an individual is found at the root of a hegemonic state. Though Epameinondas did not create a *politeia*, Ephoros believed he brought the hegemonic virtue of *paideia* to Thebes. The net result was the same: a state achieved dominance because one man provided the necessary preconditions of hegemony.

Ephoros in Context

As with all authors, Ephoros was heavily influenced by both the literary tradition within which he worked and the events that occurred during his lifetime. The nature of a universal history required Ephoros to consult a wide variety of sources. These sources in turn shaped Ephoros' conception of history and the theories around which he structured the *Histories*. Ephoros witnessed the rise of men such as Lysander and Philip who decisively influenced the course of events. Faced with the reality that individuals were capable of fundamentally shaping history, the historical tradition moved away from the earlier emphasis on universal causal theories that denied men a large causal role. This shift was demonstrated by an increasing emphasis on individual actors in literature that produced biographical histories in the fourth century and ultimately culminated in biographies themselves in the third century. Since he was a respected historian, Ephoros' emphasis on individual agency was influential for later historians who sought to produce biographical works.

This chapter seeks to place Ephoros within the broader historical and literary context of the fourth century. It is not intended to be a complete study of all the literary, historical, and cultural forces that existed during Ephoros' lifetime. Instead, I wish to show that Ephoros' emphasis on the individual was part of a broader literary movement during the fourth century. I begin with an examination of Ephoros' literary sources and a brief discussion of his historical methodology. I next briefly summarize the actions of Lysander, Agesilaos, the tyrants of Pherae, and Philip II of Macedon in order to demonstrate that many of the directions in which Ephoros' world turned were the result of choices made by a select few individuals. I then highlight the shared emphasis on the *politeia* and *nomothetai* found in Plato, Xenophon, and Ephoros before

concluding with a short discussion of the history of biographical literature and Ephoros' place within that tradition.

Ephoros drew from a multitude of earlier historical works to compose the *Histories*. The standard treatment of Ephoros' sources remains that of Godfrey Barber.¹⁰¹ As with all ancient historians, it is often difficult to track Ephoros' sources, as he did not consistently cite his predecessors. Therefore, source identification is most often based on similarities in events or individuals described in the directly attributed fragments of Ephoros' *Histories* to events or individuals in the works of Ephoros' predecessors. Based on these similarities, Barber was able to identify a number of Ephoros' main sources and make suggestions concerning his supplemental sources. For the earlier period, from the Return of the Heracleidae to the Persian Wars, Barber concludes that Ephoros drew primarily from Hellanicus and Herodotus, supplementing these with at least Ctesias' work on Persia. For the period between the Persian and Second Peloponnesian War, Ephoros used a biased Athenian source, likely an *Atthis*, and a Persian source. From 431 to 411, his main source was Thucydides, and from the end of the Peloponnesian War down to the Battle of Cnidos in 394 he used the Oxyrhynchus Historian.¹⁰² Finally, Callisthenes was his main textual source for the remainder of the period covered in the *Histories*. Ephoros supplemented the work of these authors by means of personal investigations, including individual testimonies, and by means of inscriptions, political documents, and works of what we would call non-historical literature, such as the works of rhetoric, drama, and poetry.

¹⁰¹Barber 1935, 113-137.

¹⁰² The date of 394 for the end of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* is theoretical and was accepted in Barber's day. An alternative terminal date of 386 is equally possible (Hornblower 1994, 37).

Simon Hornblower's recent study of Ephoros produced largely similar results.¹⁰³ He identifies slightly different sources for Ephoros' work. Hornblower argues that Philistus, a Syracusan historian and military officer under the tyrants Dionysius I and II, was the primary source for events in the West during the late fifth and early fourth centuries.¹⁰⁴ In the East, especially for contemporary events, Hornblower argues that Dinon of Kolophon, who was active in the early part of the fourth century and the father of the Alexander historian Cleitarchus, and Ctesias of Cnidos, a Greek serving as Artaxerxes II's personal physician who wrote a large work on Persia as well as works on India and geography, were Ephoros' principal sources.¹⁰⁵ Hornblower treats Herodotus and Thucydides as Ephoros' main sources for early Greek history; Hellanicus is reduced to the status of a secondary source.

As this discussion of his sources suggests, Ephoros relied extensively on both earlier and contemporary histories. A "broad documentary foundation" formed the base on which Ephoros built the *Histories*.¹⁰⁶ This is the largest difference between Ephoros and other early Greek historians, and while it earned him accusations of plagiarism (T17 *apud* Eusebius *Praeparatio Evangelica* 10.3) it is clearly the result of the scope of his work. A universal history would have been impossible without the wide use of both preceding and contemporary authors.¹⁰⁷ Because of this emphasis, the extent to which he covered a given topic would be directly related to the amount of valid textual evidence available.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰³ Hornblower 1994, 35-37.

¹⁰⁴ On Philistus, see Meister 1996-2003b.

¹⁰⁵ On Dinon and Ctesias, see Meister 2002-a and Högemann 2002-, respectively.

¹⁰⁶ Schepens 1977b, 104.

¹⁰⁷ Schepens 1977b, 106.

¹⁰⁸ Schepens 1977b, 111-2. We should note, however, that the *Histories* retains, in a large part, the emphasis on autopsy that characterized Ephoros' predecessors. This has been noted by Schepens 1970 and Parmeggiani 2001. It would be incorrect to assume that his emphasis on secondary research made Ephoros a cloistered academic, and we should recognize the similarity

The extent of Ephoros' exposure to earlier historical literature strongly influenced the *Histories*. Two prominent concepts within the *Histories* link Ephoros' work with that of his predecessors: the idea of a succession of hegemonies and the importance of geography. The key passages and relevant scholarship have been referenced throughout this thesis, but the arguments are briefly treated again here for the sake of clarity.

Ephoros' interest in the diadochy of hegemonies closely follows the precedent of Herodotus and Thucydides. Throughout Herodotus' *History*, new powerful states emerge and take the place of their predecessors; Herodotus' work is structured around the rise of the Persian Empire, which, by virtue of the Persians' 'hardness' was able to conquer 'soft' nations such as Media, Lydia, and Egypt, who themselves had conquered earlier kingdoms. While Herodotus did not discuss the succession of hegemonies, he did describe the history of the Near East as a succession of empires (1.95, 13).¹⁰⁹ The Greek victory in the Persian Wars suggests another transfer of power, this time to the west. The similarity between Herodotus' use of the *koros-hybris-ate* sequence and Ephoros' use of *tryphe* to explain what brings down a powerful state further demonstrates the extent of Ephoros' interaction with this precedent. In Thucydides, the succession of dominant states is more contained, occurring in his discussion of naval powers in the *Archaeologia* (1.4-1.19).

The hegemonic succession outlined by Ephoros in F118 must be viewed in this context. Wickersham has argued that Ephoros is the first historian who "regards hegemony as a problem

of his research to that of his predecessors. While Ephoros relied more on textual sources than his predecessors did, the importance of seeing the object of study remained substantial, as Ephoros considered being present "by far the best of all modes of learning" (F111 *apud* Polybius 12.27.7). Autopsy remained the ideal, and while the scope of Ephoros' project made it impossible for him to be present for all the events he records, such investigation still figures prominently. Ephoros employed autopsy to recover evidence to test tradition, using what he found to verify accounts of the past.

¹⁰⁹ See Momigliano 1987, 31-57 for a discussion of imperial succession in Greek historiography.

calling for comprehensive discussion in his work.”¹¹⁰ However, Wickersham’s work also shows that a strong interest in hegemonies existed in earlier historians. Moreover, Canfora has persuasively demonstrated that Thucydides’ *Archaeologia* created a precedent for later authors such as Xenophon, Theopompos, and Ephoros who organized their histories around a hegemonic diadochy, and Parmeggiani has explicitly linked Ephoros’ methodology to that of Thucydides in the *Archaeologia*.¹¹¹

Moreover, Herodotus, Xenophon, and Ephoros each conceived of geography as an important factor in explaining why states are able to develop power. Herodotus claimed that rugged geography produced men capable of establishing dominant states (9.122), while Xenophon claimed that Athenian naval and Spartan land power derived from the opportunities afforded by their geographic position (*Hellenica* 7.1.2-11). For Ephoros, geography is still important, though it plays a background role as it does not produce independence or military capabilities in and of itself. F122a suggests that the Aetolians were difficult to conquer and thus enjoyed independence because they were blessed with rugged terrain which was difficult to conquer; as a result, they were able to defend their land through strength of arms acquired by diligent training. F119 tells us that Boeotia is “naturally well suited to hegemony” because of its fertile soil and access to the sea. For Ephoros geography provides a strategic opportunity rather than producing supremacy.

Ephoros’ very use of theory follows a strong historiographic tradition. Greek historians sought to create universal theories that could explain the course of history. We have already seen that Herodotus portrayed events in such a way as to emphasize the role of *koros* and *hybris* in

¹¹⁰ Wickersham 1994, 127.

¹¹¹ Canfora 1972, 87-94; Canfora 1999, 26-43; Parmeggiani 1999; Parmeggiani 2001; and Christesen, “Spartan’s and Scythians.”

explaining the downfall of powerful states. For Thucydides, an orderly and secure state could only exist when effective *nomoi* were in place and served as a restraint on *physis*. Ephoros selected and presented events to argue that an effective *politeia* promoted *eleutheria* by eliminating *pleonexia* and *tryphe*. We should note the resemblance of Ephoros' theories to those of these two historians. Both Herodotus and Ephoros used the debilitating effects of wealth to explain the collapse of hegemonic powers, while Ephoros' beliefs that a healthy state required the restraint of a strong *politeia* strongly resemble Thucydides' emphasis on the constraints created by strong *nomoi*.

The only area in which Ephoros significantly deviates from the historiographical tradition is his emphasis on the individual. As we have seen, individuals in earlier historians possessed a limited degree of historical agency. Men such as Herodotus' Themistocles and Thucydides' Pericles clearly influenced events, but not in any systematic fashion. Yet for Ephoros, certain individuals were capable of fundamentally reshaping the Greek world. Lycurgus and Rhadamanthys created new *politeiai* that enabled their states to achieve a position of dominance. Lysander altered Lycurgus' *politeia* and thus ended Spartan hegemony. Epameinondas was such an embodiment of the hegemonic virtues of *andreia* and *paideia* that he enabled the previously unsuccessful Thebans to emerge as hegemon over Greece.

To explain this difference, we must turn to the events of the fourth century and developments in other areas of Greek literature. After the Peloponnesian War, the Greek world increasingly fell under the influence of a series of powerful men. Lysander, Agesilaos, the tyrants of Pherae, and Philip of Macedon all sought to achieve a position of unquestioned

dominance over the rest of the Greek world and to use this as a base from which to expand their authority outside of Greece itself.¹¹²

After defeating the Athenian fleet at Aegospotami, Lysander possessed unmatched power in the Aegean. He sought to secure Spartan power in the region by installing pro-Spartan decarchies and sending harmosts to *poleis* formerly allied with Athens. After Athens surrendered, he backed the Thirty's seizure of power in Athens, and the following year, with the support of his brother Libys, who held the office of navarch, aided the Thirty in their war with Thrasybulus. Upon the death of Agis II, Lysander's support of Agesilaos was pivotal in securing for the latter both the throne and subsequently command of the forces sent against Persia in 396. Despite the extent of his power, he lacked official authority and thus had to defer to the kings when they disagreed with him. As we have seen, the literary record recounts an attempt by Lysander to create an elected monarchy in order that he might capitalize on his popularity and gain official authority; the accuracy of this claim is difficult to assess. It is clear, however, that Lysander played a significant role in the Greek world during the period. His attempts to create a Spartan empire through both direct and indirect control of Athens' former allies mark a fundamental shift in the nature of Spartan power, as, since the sixth century, Spartan authority had been based upon alliances through the Peloponnesian League rather than conquest, annexation, or de facto rule. After the Peloponnesian War, Lysander's actions alienated many of Sparta's former allies in the League, such as Corinth and Boeotia, who then allied with Athens in an attempt to check the growth of Spartan power. Lysander thus bears a large portion of the

¹¹² Epameinondas also was a significant individual, though his efforts seem to have been primarily focused on securing Thebes' position.

responsibility for the political restructuring that occurred in the wake of the Peloponnesian War.¹¹³

During his four-decade reign, Agesilaos was a dominant force both within Sparta and in the Greek world as a whole. Shortly after gaining the throne, he led a Spartan expedition against the Persian possessions in Asia Minor, where his successes gave him a large degree of freedom from the authority of the ephors and *gerousia*. After Lysander's death at Haliartus and Pausanias' failure to prevent or avenge that defeat, Agesilaos was recalled to Greece in order to secure Spartan hegemony. In the King's Peace that ended the Corinthian War, Agesilaos was able to ensure that Sparta was established as the guarantor of the peace, which gave Sparta a position of unparalleled dominance in Greece. He used this power to, among other things, weaken Thebes' hold over the other Boeotian *poleis*, end the union of Corinth and Argos, destroy the walls of Mantinea, and force that city to separate into its constituent villages. Despite his victories, however, he was unable to secure Sparta's position, as other Greek states saw Sparta as an aggressor state and a threat to their own sovereignty and thus increasingly resisted his policies. He thus bears a large degree of the responsibility for Sparta's downfall. His role as the dominant voice in Sparta for many of the years preceding the disaster at Leuctra and his implementation of aggressive policies that sought to ensure Spartan hegemony created resentment, which ultimately resulted in the formation of balancing coalitions to resist Spartan power.¹¹⁴

The tyrants of Pherae also sought to extend their authority in a similar fashion.

Possessing a large army of cavalry, hoplites, and mercenaries, Lycophron established Pherae as

¹¹³ For events of Lysander's life, see Andrewes 1982-2005, 489-496; Lewis 1982-2005, 24-32 and 40-44; Pomeroy, *et al.* 1999, 315-335; and Welwei 2002-b.

¹¹⁴ For events of Agesilaos' life, see Cartledge 1987; Seager 1982-2005a; Seager 1982-2005b, 156-163; Roy 1982-2005; Pomeroy, *et al.* 1999, 330-370; and Welwei 2002-a.

the dominant force in Thessaly by defeating a coalition of the other Thessalian cities. After his death, Jason continued expanding Pherae's military capabilities, eventually challenging Athens for control of the lumber-rich areas around Amphipolis and threatening Boeotian control of central Greece. Moreover, he planned to construct a fleet larger than the rebuilt Athenian navy, which, had he completed it, would have made Pherae the center of military power in the Greek world. Finally, he sought to lead a pan-Hellenic expedition against Persia. His efforts were cut short by his assassination in 370, though his son Alexander continued to build the strength of Pherae until his defeat by the Thebans at the Battle of Cynoscephalae in 364. After Alexander's death, a series of individuals ruled Pherae, but were not able to achieve the same degree of influence as Jason and Alexander. For the southern Greeks, the threat of Pherae was linked to the lives of Jason and Alexander, who had successfully turned the *polis* from a city in a backwards part of Greece into a major player in the power struggles of the mid-fourth century.¹¹⁵

Finally, the successes of Philip II of Macedon starting in the early 350s demonstrated to the entire Greek world the extent to which one man could influence the course of history. Macedon had flourished in the early 5th century under the protection of Persia, and this enabled its kings to establish Macedon as the dominant power in the region. However, this power collapsed in the early fourth century. From 400 to 360, Macedon had eight kings. This instability culminated in the defeat and death of Perdiccas III, Philip's older brother, along with thousands of his troops. Surrounding kingdoms began efforts to take control of Macedonian territory while numerous individuals fought over the throne. When Philip became king, he had little on which to base his power. Yet within a decade, he had created a centralized state that was powerful enough to threaten an invasion of Attica. Through both military genius and astute political maneuvering,

¹¹⁵ For events in Thessaly in the early 4th century, see Seager 1982-2005b, 172-186; Cobet 2002-a; Cobet 2002-b; Kramolisch 2002-; and Schmitz 2002-.

Philip transformed Macedon from a practically failed state into the dominant force in Greece. Panhellenists such as Isocrates began to turn to Philip as someone who was potentially capable of uniting the Greeks in an effort to defeat the Persians. While Philip's ultimate conquest of Greece and the beginnings of the Macedonian invasion of Persia came after the years covered in the *Histories* and thus we do not know if Ephoros was familiar with them, his earlier achievements alone spectacular enough to convey his preeminence and influence within the Greek world.¹¹⁶

These men had a decisive impact on Greek history of the fourth century. They all affected the relative position of their states within the Greek world, and several changed important aspects of their state, such as Lysander's establishment of direct rule of conquered territories and Philip's creation of a strong centralized state. More importantly, all of them had hegemonic ambitions and challenged the multipolar power structure of Greece.

The work of Greek authors of the period reflects the increasing influence of individuals. Both Plato and Xenophon considered *politeiai* and *nomothetai* as worthy of lengthy discussion, reflecting an interest in how individuals shaped particular states, while Isocrates and Xenophon wrote *encomia*. Importantly, the fourth century also witnessed the development of biographical histories that led to the emergence of biography itself as an independent literary genre in the third century. The *Histories* was both a part of and influenced by this new literary movement.

The role of individuals in Ephoros' *Histories* bears a strong resemblance to the treatment of individuals in Socratic philosophy. Both Plato's *Laws* and Xenophon's *Lakedaimonion Politeia* credited individuals with the creation of successful states. For Plato, the ideal *politieia* would most readily come into existence if the wisdom to recognize the important elements of a

¹¹⁶ For the events of Philip's life, see Pomeroy, *et al.* 1999, 371-394; Badian 1996-2003; and Worthington 2008

politeia and the power to successfully implement one were combined in a single person (*Laws* 711e-12a). For Plato, men could exert a large influence on the nature and rate of societal change. In his treatise on Sparta's laws, Xenophon gives Lycurgus sole credit for establishing the power of the Spartan state (1.1-2). The institutional reforms implemented by Lycurgus created the conditions necessary for obtaining supremacy. For both Plato and Xenophon, the most influential men were those who established *politeiai* because *politeiai* determined the hegemonic potential of a state. These works were obviously influential for Ephoros. The *Histories* closely follows the beliefs found in those works on the importance of *nomothetai*, hegemonic virtues such as *homonoia* and *andreia*, the role of Lycurgus in creating the Spartan *politeia*, and the link between the *politeia* and hegemony.

Before we discuss the relationship of biographical literature to Ephoros, we should first note the difference between biography and biographical history. Biographies "aimed to reveal a man's character by describing his childhood and through telling anecdotes" and might be overly laudatory. A biographical history gave individuals a prominent position or centered the work on the life and deeds of a specific individual as Theopompos did in his *Philippica*.¹¹⁷ The former did not yet exist in the strictest sense during Ephoros' lifetime, while the latter emerged over the course of the fourth century.¹¹⁸

Our knowledge of the Greek biographical literary tradition is relatively limited. The earliest non-fragmentary biographies date to the first century BCE; none of the early biographical literature from the third and second centuries, during which much biographical

¹¹⁷ Luce 1997, 117. Tacitus provides a salient example of these two genres: the *Agricola* is an example of a biography while the *Annales* and *Historiae* were biographical histories.

¹¹⁸ On biography and history, see Gentili and Cerri 1988; Momigliano 1993, 8-22; Luce 1997, 116-118; Blanshard 2007, 156-157; Geddes 2007, 112-116; Pelling 2007, 75-88; and works cited therein.

research was conducted, have survived intact.¹¹⁹ We know relatively little concerning the earliest stages of the development of biography. While some have contended that biography existed as early as the fifth century, it is safer by far to say that the origins of biography reach back to the fifth century.¹²⁰ The fourth century experienced significant growth in literature that focused on individuals and saw the first biographical histories. The relative lack of surviving source material makes it difficult to pinpoint precisely when biographies in the strictest sense were first written, though we can date the phenomenon generally to the third century.¹²¹

Görgemanns has identified four key developments that predated the emergence of biography in the third century: anecdotes, comprehensive assessments of prominent individuals

¹¹⁹ Momigliano 1993, 8-9.

¹²⁰ e.g., Homeyer 1962 and Momigliano 1993, 23-42. We should be hesitant about this claim due both to our lack of original source material and the fact that, for Momigliano, “any account in verse or prose that tells us something about an individual can be taken as preparatory to biography; and any statement about oneself, whether in poetry or in prose, can be regarded as autobiographical” (23). This definition enables Momigliano to count Ion’s *Epidemiai* as an autobiography and Stesimbrotus’ writings on Athenian leaders as biography. Momigliano’s definition of biography here is too liberal. The mere presence of personal details is not sufficient to term a work biographical, nor does the inclusion of biographical digressions prove the existence of biography as an independent literary form. Moreover, Momigliano himself acknowledges that his conclusions concerning biographies written by Skylax and Xanthus are based on less than solid evidence (Skylax’ work is attested solely in a disputed part of the *Suda* and the context of Xanthus’ work is entirely unclear). Finally, we should not suppose, as Momigliano does, that the interest in the lives of Homer, Hesiod, the Seven Sages or assorted early poets produced full-fledged biographies of which we have no record. Thus, his conclusion that “both biographical and autobiographical works were known in the fifth century B.C.—even outside the narrow sphere of literary and mythological biography” (31) must be viewed with skepticism.

¹²¹ Xenophon’s *Cyropaedia* complicates this picture. Görgemanns calls it an experimentation within the genre while Momigliano goes a step further and argues that it is “the most accomplished biography we have in classical Greek literature” (Görgemanns 2002-, 648 and Momigliano 1993, 54-57). The work has been also been identified as a proto-, historical or pedagogical novel, a romance, an essay on political leadership, a treatise on constitutional theory, a book on military tactics and strategy, pan-Hellenic propaganda, and, most recently, a pamphlet advocating military reforms in Sparta (see Tigerstedt 1965-78, 177; Tatum 1989, xv; Due 2003, 588; Christesen 2006; and works cited therein). It is difficult to determine what genre the *Cyropaedia* actually represents, if it in fact belongs to a single genre.

within historical literature, *encomia*, and Socratic literature's emphasis on the life and character of Socrates.¹²² Anecdotes were common during the fifth century and provided abundant biographical details involving both mythological and literary figures from the distant past and contemporary leaders. The most noteworthy example of an author of anecdotes is Ion of Chios, whose works were used extensively by Plutarch in his *Lives*. He is often regarded as responsible for the new interest in writing about individuals and thus played a key role in the development of biography.¹²³ Within historical literature, there are numerous examples of individuals discussed at some length: the Persian kings in Herodotus, Pericles in Thucydides' work, and Cyrus and Agesilaos in Xenophon's *Anabasis* and *Hellenica*, respectively, are instances of this tendency. This emphasis eventually expanded and evolved into biographical histories such as Theopompos' *Philippica*. *Encomia* include both early praise songs and poems of varying lengths about lovers, athletic and military victors, and political leaders and, starting in the fourth century, lengthy writings such as Isocrates' *Evagoras* and Xenophon's *Agesilaos*.¹²⁴ Examples of the biographical emphasis in Socratic literature can be found throughout Plato's *Apology* and *Phaedo*, Xenophon's *Apologia* and *Memorabilia* and the letters attributed to Plato, notably *Letter 7*.¹²⁵

These precedents evolved into two separate forms of literature: biographical histories and biography itself. By the closing decades of the fourth century, these developments resulted in the

¹²² Görgemanns 2002-, 648-649.

¹²³ A recent edited volume, *The World of Ion of Chios*, with an extensive bibliography has been devoted to his work. The sections most relevant to the discussion of Ion's role in the development of biography are Geddes 2007, 112-116 and Pelling 2007, 75-88. See also Jacoby 1947; Huxley 1965; Momigliano 1993, 28-33; and works cited therein.

¹²⁴ Robbins 2002-. Luce identifies the *Evagoras* and *Agesilaos* as biographies, though they are more traditionally identified as *encomia* (e.g., Momigliano 1993, 49-51 and Görgemanns 2002-, 646-649).

¹²⁵ Momigliano 1993, 46-47, 52-54, 58-59, 60-62.

production of a large number of biographical histories: over twenty historians are known to have chronicled the life of Alexander.¹²⁶ In the next century, these works produced an independent genre of biography, though the lack of surviving sources prevents us from determining precisely how, when, and why G6rgemanns' precedents and biographical history evolved into works such as Nepos' and Plutarch's.

Since Ephoros was well-read and the *Histories* were widely read, the work was both influential to and heavily influenced by these developments. In the history of biography, Ephoros' work is most immediately relevant to the comprehensive discussion of individuals contained within historical literature. While earlier authors had provided many details about certain individuals, Ephoros took this tradition a step further. As we have seen, the abundance of information he provided about Lycurgus led Tigerstedt to conclude that Ephoros produced the first biography of the Spartan.¹²⁷ Though calling Ephoros' description of Lycurgus a 'biography' requires a liberal use of the word, Ephoros' account was clearly an expansion of the tradition in historiography that G6rgemanns has identified. This marks an increase in the extent of biographical details concerning individual actors provided by Greek historians within their works. More importantly, he granted a significant degree of historical agency to certain key individuals, those who influenced *politeiai*. We should note that biographical history began during Ephoros' lifetime and flourished with the Alexander historians after his death. Ephoros, by expanding the extent of the discussion of individuals and the scale of their historical agency, provided a respected historiographic precedent for this development.

¹²⁶ Luce 1997, 116.

¹²⁷ Tigerstedt 1965-78, 1: 210. See p. 41 in this thesis.

Conclusion

This thesis has attempted to explain Ephoros' conception of the role of the individual in history. We have seen that Ephoros, like the historians who preceded him, constructed his history in a fashion that revealed what he saw as the underlying forces that shaped the course of human affairs. Ephoros strongly emphasized the importance of *politeiai*. States which possessed healthy *politeiai* were able to achieve hegemony and thus exert a large degree of influence within the Greek world. Ephoros chose to portray *politeiai* as the product of single and singular individuals, and thus these men play a large role in the *Histories*.

A detailed examination of key individuals in the fragments reveals that Ephoros altered the earlier traditions regarding these individuals in order to emphasize their importance. The *Histories* is the first historical work in which Lycurgus was granted significant historical agency and in which his actions as a *nomothetes* were used to explain the rise of Sparta to a position of preeminence in the Greek world. Moreover, what fragments exist concerning the decline of Spartan power suggest that Ephoros portrayed Lysander as largely responsible for ending Sparta's hegemony, by virtue of his dilution of the Lycurgan precepts. Ephoros also recast early Cretan history by reducing the importance of King Minos while creating two new individuals, Rhadamanthys and Kres, who created the Cretan *politeia* and thalassocracy, respectively. Finally, the Theban hegemony in the *Histories* is explicitly linked to the life of Epameinondas. Clearly, Ephoros believed that individuals were capable of influencing the course of history.

Not surprisingly, both earlier literature and contemporary events exerted a strong influence on Ephoros. Ephoros read widely and drew heavily from other authors: his interests in hegemonic succession, geography, luxury and even his use of theory all have antecedents in histories from the fifth and early fourth centuries. The one area where he differs significantly

from earlier historians is in his emphasis on the role of the individual. A strong precedent for Ephoros' conception of individual agency is found in Xenophon's *Lakedaimonian Politeia*, and some elements of Plato's *Laws* display a similar trend. Moreover, the *Histories* represents an important step in the development of Greek biography both because of the marked increase of the extent of biographical details provided in his work and because of the degree of historical agency he granted to individuals. These developments should be viewed in light of the fact that powerful individuals exerted an increasing degree of influence over the Greek world in the fourth century and in light of an emergent biographical literature, the roots of which can be traced back to the fifth century.

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